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Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration
Amy J. Schmitz*
Paradox (n.) = "a statement etc. that seems to contradict itself
or to conflict with common sense but which contains a truth (as
"more haste, less speed')"'
I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration is private but not confidential. This is a paradox to the
extent that it is seemingly contradictory, but states a truth. Arbitration is
private in that it is a closed process, but it is not confidential because
information revealed during the process may become public. This has
caused misperceptions and confusion regarding the arbitration process.
Contracting parties often assume that arbitration's privacy denies the
public access to not only arbitration hearings, but also information
revealed during the hearings. These parties may then accept arbitration
agreements without contracting for confidentiality. This, in turn, may
negatively impact corporate parties expecting arbitration to shield their
business information, as well as individuals who assume that personal
information revealed in arbitration will remain secret.
It is true that arbitration proceedings generally are private and do not
produce published opinions that courts infuse into public law. It is not
correct, however, to assume that information revealed in arbitration is
automatically confidential.2 In other words, United States law does not
guarantee such secrecy of arbitration information, and institutional rules
parties incorporate in their arbitration agreements generally do not
provide broad confidentiality protections.3 Furthermore, third party
participants who do not agree to any confidentiality agreement or rules
remain free to talk about the arbitration proceedings.
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Arbitration, 14 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 121, 129-31 (2003).




Confusion regarding privacy and confidentiality in arbitration
therefore fosters misguided contracting, as well as simplistic assumptions
regarding the value of secrecy in the arbitration process.4 Privacy and
confidentiality may be good and bad for the parties. Both may allow
parties to save resources and reputation costs by arbitrating disputes
outside the public purview.5 This may be especially true for "repeat
players" that routinely incorporate arbitration clauses in their form
contracts.6 Such routine arbitration may allow these players to enjoy
efficiency benefits, which they may pass on by offering lower prices,
higher wages, and better quality products.7 Corporate parties sometimes
misperceive benefits of arbitration's privacy, however, by assuming it
will automatically ensure the secrecy of their trade and business
information.
In contrast, consumer and employee advocates often focus only on
drawbacks of arbitration's privacy without considering how individuals
could benefit from increased confidentiality in the process. They
complain that arbitration's privacy unduly benefits repeat players by
allowing them to hide unfavorable information about their discriminatory
practices, product defect and safety concerns, and other legal violations.
This hinders future claimants in proving cases of repeat offenses. Some
also claim that the lack of published opinions in arbitration thwarts
development of the law in areas affecting public interests, such as civil
rights and product defect.
8
These critics often overlook, however, how privacy and
confidentiality in arbitration may benefit individuals with cases involving
sensitive personal information. Indeed, individuals would be wise to
contractually protect the confidentiality of their personal information.
Without such contractual protection, consumers may become subject to
arbitration provisions in form credit card contracts that block public
access to awards revealing the financial companies' misconduct, but
neglect to protect the confidentiality of consumers' personal financial
4. Buys, supra note 2, at 122 (noting how confidentiality "is said to be one of the aspects of
arbitration that is highly valued," without any explanation why it is valuable or consideration of how
its value may vary depending on context).
5. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Out of National Law: An Empirical Look at the
New Law Merchant, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 523, 531-32 (2005) (discussing a basic model for
choosing arbitration over litigation).
6. See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is it Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1631, 1650-61 (2005) (explaining the pros and cons of the "repeat player" phenomenon).
7. See Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 741,
764 (2001) (explaining how "individuals may be better off agreeing even to one-sided arbitration
clauses" due to efficiency benefits of arbitration programs).
8. See Sternlight, supra note 6, at 1648-55 (discussing arguments against mandatory
arbitration).
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information. Similarly, sexual harassment claimants may be dismayed
when they cannot prevent witnesses from gossiping regarding what they
learn while participating in arbitration hearings.9 Moreover, increased
transparency in arbitration may dissuade sexual harassment claimants
and those with poor financial histories from asserting their claims.
These multi-textured transparency issues raise thorny questions and
complications. Do we want more or less transparency in arbitration?
Should this vary in domestic versus international arbitration, or in
arbitration pursuant to contract versus proceedings per statutory or
administrative rule? t° Should different standards apply in arbitrations
involving public parties, or in the proceedings consumers or employees
must pursue under form agreements?
This Article does not tackle all these questions. Instead, it merely
seeks to clarify the distinctions between privacy and confidentiality in
domestic arbitration pursuant to non-public parties' private agreements,
and to spark discussion of transparency reforms that respond to effects of
these distinctions in that context. Part II, therefore, discusses the
differences between privacy and confidentiality in such non-public
arbitration. Part III addresses the benefits and drawbacks of this privacy.
Part IV explores ramifications of the confusion about confidentiality in
arbitration. Part V then confronts the privacy paradox, by proposing a
two-pronged policy that combines increased confidentiality of personal
information with decreased privacy in cases affecting public interests.
The Article concludes with an invitation for further discussion and
debate regarding the ramifications of conflicting tensions raised by the
privacy paradox.
9. Of course, it may be practically impossible to prevent gossip due to human inclinations.
See Richard C. Reuben, The Sound of Dust Settling: A Response to Criticisms of the UMA, 2003 J.
Disp. RESOL. 99, 124-25 (2003) (noting practical difficulties of imposing liability for disclosure of
mediation communications).
10. Costs and benefits of transparency vary greatly even within the international realm,
especially with respect to private versus public or semi-public trade and investment arbitration. See
Buys, supra note 2, at 121-23, 131-34 (emphasizing increased values of transparency in
international trade and investment arbitration due to strong public interest in these disputes); Susan
D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International
Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1521, 1539-41, 1544-45, 1625 (2005)
(discussing ambiguities of transparency rules in international investment and trade arbitration despite
the public nature of treaty rights at issue in many of these arbitrations under the rules of the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes). Accordingly, such international and
public versus private debates are beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, it focuses only on
arbitration pursuant to private agreement.
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II. MEANING OF PRIVACY VERSUS CONFIDENTIALITY IN ARBITRATION
"Privacy" and "confidentiality" have varied meanings. 1  In
arbitration, privacy generally refers to arbitration's closed and non-public
process, which prevents public access to hearings or published opinions
that would aid development of public law. 12 In contrast, confidentiality
in arbitration refers to secrecy of information regarding or revealed
through the arbitration process. 13  Privacy thus does not ensure
confidentiality of arbitration proceedings. 14  Information about and
learned through domestic arbitrations may become public unless the
parties contractually require that this information remain confidential.'
5
Arbitration therefore is not entirely secret.'
6
A. Privacy
Arbitration developed as a means for providing self-contained
dispute resolution that culminates in a third-party determination, but may
be more efficient and flexible than litigation because it is not subject to
judicial strictures.' 7  In addition, Western models of arbitration are
generally private in that only the parties to the arbitration agreement and
their invitees may attend the proceedings.' 8 Arbitration also is private to
11. See generally Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Going Public. Diminishing Privacy in Dispute
Resolution in the Internet Age, 7 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, 8-97 (2002),
http://www.vjolt.net/vol7/issue2/v7i2_a04-Rabinovitch-Einy.pdf (noting the varied meanings of
privacy and focusing on informational privacy in online dispute resolution (ODR), which breaks
down into secrecy, anonymity, and control of information). I use "confidentiality" to refer to the
secrecy of information about and learned through arbitration proceedings.
12. See OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 531 (1980) (stating various meanings of privacy,
including its reference to secluded venues and non-public status).
13. See id. at 133 (defining confidential as "to be kept secret").
14. See CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND PROBLEMS
417-18 (2002) (distinguishing privacy and confidentiality in arbitration and explaining that
arbitration rules generally do not protect confidentiality of arbitration).
15. See Buys, supra note 2, at 130 (noting how nations' rules differ regarding confidentiality,
and finding that United States law generally provides no duty of confidentiality).
16. See Michael D. Goldhaber, Sneak Peek: An Inside Look at More than 100 Major Disputes
from the Secret World of Arbitration, Focus Europe 22 (Summer 2005), available at
http://www.americanlawyer.com/focuseurope/scorecard0605.html [hereinafter Sneak Peek]
(reporting information regarding 130 disputes, and noting how information easily leaks out about
arbitrations).
17. JULIUS HENRY COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 25 (1918) (quoting
JOHN MONTGOMERIE BELL, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ARBITRATION 1N SCOTLAND I (2d ed. 1877)).
18. Western and English reverence for individualism and personal autonomy supports privacy
in a manner foreign to some Asian cultures. In Chinese arbitration and mediation, for example, there
is no high regard for privacy, and parties do not necessarily expect or want privacy. See Carlos de
Vera, Arbitrating Harmony. 'Med-Arb' and the Confluence of Culture and Rule of Law in the
Resolution of International Commercial Disputes in China, 18 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 149, 186-88
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the extent that arbitrators do not publish reasoned opinions that provide
information to the public regarding arbitrated cases and further
development of the law. 19 Arbitration may therefore "privatize" the
law.20
1. Private Process
Arbitration's private process limits its transparency by precluding the
public's observation of and participation in the process . Judges, juries,
and court clerks do not attend or participate in arbitrations. Instead,
arbitration proceedings are closed to government officials, the press, and
other uninvited third parties. The public therefore has access to little
information regarding the conduct and outcomes in arbitration
proceedings.
This privacy intends to provide "an atmosphere of relative coziness"
that may foster friendly peacemaking. Generally, an arbitration hearing
is more "cozy" than a court in that it takes place in a conference room
and only the arbitrators, the parties, their attorneys (if they have them), a
few witnesses, and perhaps a stenographer are present. 23  Disputants
usually sit across the table from one another in fairly close quarters
without the physical and procedural protections of a court. The formality
and degree of privacy of an arbitration proceeding depends on the
parties' agreement, any rules they incorporate in their agreement, and
norms that exist in the given context or forum.
Many have defended arbitration's private process as necessary to
foster open communications, relax tensions that often exist in the
courtroom, and allow for flexible and efficient dispute resolution.
Whether these things occur, however, depends on the arbitrator's skill
and willingness to move proceedings along and restore order when
stress-driven contentions and arguments breed "chaos." 24 The absence of
public policing of arbitration procedures, however, makes it tough to
(2004) (discussing how Chinese med-arb focuses on creating harmony over protecting privacy).
19. See Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through
Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REv. 703, 707-08 (1999) (distinguishing between private and government
adjudication).
20. Id. at 706-26.
21. See Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 11, at 47-48 (discussing how the introduction of ODR
is likely to breakdown "the traditional dichotomy between transparent, public court proceedings and
private ADR").
22. Soia Mentschikoff, CommercialArbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 864 (1961).




measure the successes and failures of arbitral "coziness." We can only
speculate about what happens in closed arbitration proceedings, and are
left wondering whether less powerful parties are treated fairly behind
these closed doors.25
2. No Published Opinions
Arbitration also is private to the extent that arbitration awards
generally are not published. This affects the transparency of arbitrated
cases, as well as "the law" they produce.26  Parties' arbitration
agreements set forth required procedures, and define the arbitrators'
authority in determining the parties' disputes. Although arbitrators must
remain unbiased and ensure fundamentally fair hearings, their first
priority is to obey the scope of their authority under a given arbitration
agreement. 27 This generally allows arbitrators to decide disputes based
on flexible conglomerations of law, equity, practicalities, and applicable
norms and standards.28 In this way, arbitration's privacy essentially
allows parties to contract out of, or privatize, law.
29
Professor Ware argues that arbitration agreements allow for
privatization of substantive law, including mandatory rules parties would
not otherwise be permitted to waive contractually. 30  For example,
product safety rules may be privatized through enforcement of arbitral
determinations of product defect disputes in accordance with parties'
contracts, instead of legal rules.3' Professor Ware proposes that this
privatizes product defect law because courts generally confirm and
enforce arbitration awards as judgments regardless of whether arbitrators
apply the law.32 He thus concludes that "[m]andatory law is jeopardized
by the enforcement of arbitration agreements.,
33
Although evidence is mixed, some studies show that arbitrators do
not necessarily apply the law in deciding disputes.34 Courts nonetheless
25. See Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 11, at 70-71 (noting how private process in ADR
"disproportionately works against less powerful groups such as minorities and women").
26. See Wesley A. Sturges, Arbitration-What Is It?, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1032-33 (1960)
(emphasizing arbitration's self-contained and conclusive process).
27. See id at 1032-34 (emphasizing arbitration's distinct process).
28. Id. at 1034.
29. See Ware, supra note 19, at 707 (arguing that "vast areas of law are, contrary to the
received wisdom, privatizable" through arbitration).
30. Id. at 710-11.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 710-12.
33. Id. at 710-11.
34. See id. at 719-21 (referencing Professor Soia Mentschikoff's survey of arbitrators which
revealed that ninety percent of those surveyed believed they were free to ignore legal rules to reach
1216 [Vol. 54
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confirm these awards under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and
Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) unless the arbitrators clearly exceeded
their authority in reaching their results.35 This is because these acts limit
a court's review of an arbitrator's award to procedural grounds and direct
courts to strictly enforce arbitration awards to protect arbitration's
independent process.36 The Supreme Court of the United States has
emphasized this finality, and most other federal and state courts have
followed suit.37 Courts have looked to the goals and functions of
arbitration to guide them in reinforcing arbitration's finality as necessary
to guard its privacy, flexibility, and efficiency.38
Despite this general privacy, however, some non-governmental
adjudication proceedings remain open to the public and media attention
(e.g., some Olympic and sporting adjudications). Such proceedings
nonetheless fail to produce public law. The privacy of arbitration awards
in these cases continues to foster privatization of law, which may be
problematic when it allows matters of health and safety to escape public
scrutiny. When closed arbitrations of manufacturing defect claims
produce no published opinions, for example, the public fails to learn
about these defects. This leads arbitration critics to call for more
transparency in arbitration.39
"just" decisions). But see Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration and the Lessons of
ADR, 40 TEX. INT'L L.J. 449, 514-15 (2005) (concluding that "it is fair to say that arbitrators usually
do try their best to model their awards on what courts would do in similar cases-and that as often as
not they succeed in doing so. That is at least what the scanty empirical evidence seems to
suggest .... ).
35. Id. See also Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration's Finality Through
Functional Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 124-32 (2002) (emphasizing the finality of arbitration
awards under the FAA and UAA).
36. See id. at 124-35 (discussing finality of arbitration under the FAA). Section 10 of the
FAA prescribes limited grounds for judicial review focused on preservation of basic procedural
fairness, and section II allows for judicial modification or correction of certain apparent errors in an
award. Id. The FAA does not, however, permit a court to question the merits of an arbitration
award. Id.
37. Id.
38. See Brennan v. King, 139 F.3d 258, 266 n.7 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding a dispute resolution
procedure in an employment contract was not arbitration governed by the FAA because it
constrained the scope of the arbitrator's authority and limited the effect of the arbitral decision,
leaving "little ground for a 'reasonable expectation' that the procedure will resolve the dispute")
(citation omitted); see also Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., Ill F.3d 343, 349 (3d Cir.
1997) (refusing to apply the FAA to non-binding arbitration pursuant to state Lemon Law
procedures that allowed parties to pursue litigation if the arbitration delayed for more than forty
days).
39. See infra Part III. A-B (discussing pros and cons of privacy).
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
B. Confidentiality
Confidentiality goes beyond privacy. It connotes secrecy. In
arbitration, such confidentiality would preclude disclosure of any
evidence, communications, or other information about or gleaned
through an arbitration proceeding. Parties, arbitrators, witnesses, and
any others involved in the process would have to keep everything learned
in arbitration secret. The press and the public would therefore lose
access to not only hearings and awards, but also underlying information
about arbitrated cases. Furthermore, arbitration submissions, testimony,
and communications would be inadmissible in court proceedings.
This is not reality. Such confidentiality generally does not exist in
arbitration, and underlying information may become public. 40 The FAA
does not address arbitral confidentiality and United States law does not
otherwise ensure secrecy of information about or disclosed in
arbitration.4 1  The majority of American courts therefore permit
discovery of arbitration materials in later cases.42
This means arbitration is less confidential than mediation and other
non-binding alternative dispute resolution processes.43 Unlike these non-
binding processes, arbitration does not rely on secrecy of shared
information to foster voluntary settlements.44 Arbitration is more like a
trial in that it culminates in a binding award, ending parties' disputes
regardless of whether they can reach a voluntary settlement.
Accordingly, arbitrating parties must contract for confidentiality.45 They
40. See DRAHOZAL, supra note 14, at 417-26 (discussing the law's silence regarding
confidentiality in arbitration).
41. See Steven Kouris, Confidentiality: Is International Arbitration Losing One of Its Major
Benefits?, 22 J. INT'L. ARB. 127, 134-35 (2005) (noting how United States law, in contrast to law in
some other countries, does not protect confidentiality in arbitration in the absence of specific
agreement).
42. See DRAHOZAL, supra note 14, at 425 (also citing cases for this proposition).
43. See, e.g., Princeton Ins. Co. v. Vergano, 883 A.2d 44, 61-67 (Del. Ch. 2005) (emphasizing
role of confidentiality in fostering settlement through mediation, and finding confidentiality
considerations barred testimony of a mediator regarding parties' representations during the
mediation); PETER BINDER, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION, IN
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW JURISDICTIONS 326-31, 353 (2d ed. 2005) (explaining confidentiality
rules applicable to conciliation under the international model law, and the absence of such rules
regarding arbitration).
44. See Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 11, at 47 (noting how arbitration is less confidential than
mediation).
45. See Laurie Kratky Dord, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentialtiy in the
Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 285-86 (1999) (discussing how parties must
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nonetheless rarely expend resources to negotiate such provisions because
they often assume that arbitration is naturally confidential or that the
institutional arbitration rules they incorporate in their agreements will
otherwise protect the secrecy of information disclosed during the
arbitration process.46
In reality, institutional arbitration rules generally preserve privacy
but do not ensure confidentiality of arbitration proceedings. The
commonly used American Arbitration Association (AAA) Commercial
Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, for example, do not address
confidentiality of general arbitration proceedings.47  At most, some
domestic arbitration rules require that arbitrators and administrators
refrain from disclosing certain information or otherwise maintain some
level of confidentiality.
48
Similarly, international arbitration rules often go no further than
requiring that arbitrators maintain limited levels of confidentiality in the
processes they administer. The AAA's International Arbitration Rules,
for example, provide for a presumption that hearings remain private, but
that selected awards may be publicly available unless the parties agree
otherwise.49 They also require the arbitrators, but not the parties, to
maintain the confidentiality of arbitration proceedings and awards. 50 The
Internal Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)
similarly require arbitrators and administrators to maintain the
"confidential nature" of their arbitral tribunals' internal operations by
refraining from disclosing evidence or information they learn through
their participation in arbitration. 51 These rules generally do not,
stipulate to confidentiality in litigation, but finding "[c]onsensual secrecy pervades virtually every
phase of modem civil litigation").
46. See DRAHOZAL, supra note 14, at 425 (noting commentators' suggestion that parties add
confidentiality provisions in their arbitration agreements).
47. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION (AAA) COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND
MEDIATION PROCEDURES (July 1, 2003), available at http://www.adr.org (including no
confidentiality provision for arbitration, but requiring confidentiality with respect to mediation
disclosures). Instead of dictating confidentiality rules for its arbitrations, the AAA suggests the
parties take steps to draft their own confidentiality clauses. DRAHOZAL, supra note 14, at 425.
48. See, e.g., JAMS EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES R-24 (Feb. 19, 2005),
available at http://www.jams-enddispute.com/images/PDF/EmploymentArbitrationRules.PDF
(providing that "JAMS and the Arbitrator shall maintain the confidential nature of the Arbitration
proceeding and the Award, including the Hearing," but allowing disclosure in any award challenge
or confirmation proceeding, or if "otherwise required by law"); NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM
(NAF) CODE OF PROCEDURE R-4 (Jan. 1, 2005) (ambiguously stating that "[a]rbitration proceedings
are confidential, unless all Parties agree otherwise," but seeming to refer to the arbitrators' duty of
confidentiality by adding that parties may disclose awards and orders).
49. See Buys, supra note 2, at 127-28 (explaining AAA rules).
50. Kouris, supra note 41, at 137 (describing the AAA rules).
51. Id. at 134-35, 137 (discussing the Internal Rules of the ICC Court and a United States
court's interpretation of these rules in an international arbitration case). See also ICC, RULES OF
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however, restrict the parties' rights to disclose such information.
Moreover, most rules leave the meaning of "confidential nature" unclear.
Even when institutional rules or agreements require that arbitrations
remain confidential, parties are often left wondering whether courts will
enforce the confidentiality provisions. Some courts have found
confidentiality provisions unconscionable, 52 or that parties have waived
confidentiality requirements.5 3  They also have pierced confidentiality
provisions when a compelling government need or statutory mandate
makes disclosure of information or materials necessary. 4 For example,
some state statutes or court rules expressly bar enforcement of
confidentiality agreements that seek to restrict public access to
information affecting public health or safety.55  Some commentators also
have urged courts to vigilantly police confidentiality agreements to
protect public access where the public's interest in a dispute overrides
the disputants' freedom to contract for confidentiality.
5 6
ARBITRATION app. I at Art. 6 (2003), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/
rules.asp (requiring that confidentiality "must be respected by everyone who participates in that
work in whatever capacity"); AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, CODE OF ETHICS FOR
ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES Canon VI (2004), available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21958 (ambiguously stating that an arbitrator "should keep
confidential all matters relating to the arbitration proceedings and decision," but failing to explain
what this entails). But see LCIA, ARBITRATION RULES Art. 30.1 (1998) (providing that unless
parties have agreed otherwise, they must keep the award and all materials prepared for arbitration
confidential, except as required by law or to protect a legal right); Buys, supra note 2, at 126
(finding United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules
provide no duty of confidentiality, but preserve privacy of hearings and awards).
52. See, e.g., Plaskett v. Bechtel Int'l, 243 F. Supp. 2d 334, 340-45 (D.V.I. 2003) (finding
arbitration agreement with a confidentiality provision unconscionable).
53. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Enters., Nos. CIV. A. 99-4975, CIV. A. 99-6099, 2000
WL 387738, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 12, 2000) (dismissing breach of a confidentiality contract claim on
grounds that the claimant waived the confidentiality provision to the extent it sought to use that
provision in the same litigation).
54. See Omaha Indem. Co. v. Royal Am. Managers, Inc., 140 F.R.D. 398, 400 (W.D. Mo.
1991) (finding that federal prosecutors could use arbitration testimony transcripts subject to the
arbitrating parties' stipulation of confidentiality for impeachment in a criminal trial involving these
parties); City of Newark v. Law Dep't, 760 N.Y.S.2d 431, 436-37 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (finding
that an arbitration panel's confidentiality order was ineffectual to the extent it conflicted with the
public's access to such information under the Freedom of Information Law).
55. 'See Ronald J. Hedges, Mediation Developments & Trends, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY
MATERIALS: CIVIL PRACTICE AND LITIGATION TECHNIQUES IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 1485,
1521-31 (2005), available at SK042ALI-ABA1485 (Westlaw) (citing various state statutes and
court rules limiting enforcement or effect of confidentiality agreements in litigation and settlement
processes, but generally not addressing or allowing more enforcement with respect to private
processes).
56. See Dord, supra note 45, at 402 (proposing courts perform such balancing in determining
enforceability of confidentiality contracts); Calvin William Sharpe, Integrity Review of Statutory
Arbitration Awards, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 311, 315-17, 353-60 (2003) (proposing a system requiring
publication of arbitration awards in statutory employment claims to foster judicial review of these
awards and make arbitrators more accountable to public policy requirements).
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Additionally, confidentiality agreements precluding disclosure of
evidence and testimony may not bar parties from publicly revealing
underlying information. 57 They also will not bind witnesses and other
third party attendees unless these parties agree to the confidentiality
requirements. Such global confidentiality contracts are not, however, a
norm in arbitration. Arbitrators rarely require that all attendees sign
confidentiality agreements, and institutional arbitral rules usually do not
require such agreements.5 8  Furthermore, third parties often have no
incentive to sign confidentiality agreements. If anything, repeat players
and others with bargaining power are more likely than inexperienced
individuals to consider the need, let alone have the resources, to convince
third parties to sign confidentiality agreements.
Regardless of any confidentiality precautions parties may take,
information regarding the proceedings may nonetheless become public.
59
Human nature drives us to talk about our experiences. 60 Focus Europe,
for example, "ruffled feathers" in 2003 when it published information
researchers gathered regarding forty arbitrations involving over $200
million.61 It also raised eyebrows in 2005 with its publication of
information it gathered regarding 130 arbitrations, which mapped "an
uncharted universe" of the drama and players in "traditionally secret"
arbitrations.62  The surveyor reported that attorneys and other players in
arbitration were willing to talk about their experiences, and that
information about arbitrations "often leaks out" through securities
disclosures, press coverage, and arbitration or court papers. He
concluded that "the momentum of public disclosure is unstoppable. 63
57. Doe I v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 248, 252-58 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (concluding
that California law precluded disclosure of materials the Archbishop prepared for mediation, but did
not bar the Church from revealing the underlying information contained in the materials).
58. AAA Commercial Arbitration rules and other similar rules do not require such agreements.
See AAA, COMMERCIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES, 1499 WL 1627984, at *4 (outlining
confidentiality rules). At most, some international rules mandate that arbitrators require their
invitees to respect the confidentiality of arbitration proceedings. See ICC, RULES OF ARBITRATION,
app. II at Art. 1 (2003), at 35, http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/pdf documents/rules/
rulesarb english.pdf (allowing arbitration Chairman to invite persons to attend proceedings in
exceptional circumstances if these invitees respect "the confidential nature" of the proceedings).
59. See Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman, No. 90 CIV. 1792 (PKL), 1990 WL 124354, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (relying on an arbitrators' broad discretion in rejecting a claim that disclosure of
arguably privileged filings in an arbitration provided basis for vacating the award even though it was
unclear whether the arbitrator properly found waiver of the privilege).
60. Reuben, supra note 9, at 124-25 (noting human inclination to disclose innocently
arbitration information).
61. Sneak Peek, supra note 16, at 22.




Despite these limitations of arbitration's confidentiality, its private
proceedings are generally less transparent than court proceedings.64 The
press and the public may not freely attend and observe arbitration
hearings, and some parties agree to various levels of secrecy.
Furthermore, arbitration fosters a culture of secrecy that participants
often observe even when they do not sign confidentiality agreements.
Still, arbitration proceedings are not as confidential, or secret, as most
assume, and this unexpected transparency may disproportionately burden
those with less legal sophistication or power.
III. ACCOLADES AND ACCUSATIONS OF ARBITRATION'S PRIVACY
The public often has no interest in the resolution of others' private
disputes. 65 In such cases, private and confidential arbitration may best
promote flexible, efficient, and independent dispute resolution. In other
cases, however, such secrecy may improperly limit public access to
important information regarding unsafe, deceptive or otherwise improper
corporate practices. It also may impede necessary development of clear
and consistent public law.
66
A. Benefits of Privacy
1. Communal Dispute Resolution
Privacy of arbitration is especially beneficial for resolving disputes
among parties who share commercial, cultural, or other communal
understandings and norms. Close-knit business and cultural
communities have long used arbitration systems to resolve their disputes
quickly and efficiently in closed forums in accordance with private rules
and local norms.67 These communities are usually more concerned with
64. See Dor6, supra note 45, at 285-86 (discussing how courts sanction confidentiality in ADR
to promote settlement).
65. See Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Private Law, Public "'Justice": Another Look at Privacy,
Arbitration, and Global E-Commerce, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 769, 771-72 (2000) (noting
reasons why secrecy is generally sanctioned in arbitration).
66. See id. at 769-71, 790-93 (proposing published opinions to preserve access where
necessary to protect public interests in on-line ADR). Although parties' ability to contract out of all
public laws through arbitration agreements is hotly debated, some have proposed that arbitrators
have more incentive than judges to apply parties' privately chosen contract rules regardless of
whether they comport with public law. See Drahozal, supra note 5, at 524-25 (exploring empirical
support for parties' contracting out of all national law through arbitration contracts).
67. See COHEN, supra note 17, at 24-27 (noting utility of arbitration despite development of a
judicial system in mercantile cases); see also James A.R. Nafziger, Arbitration of Rights and
Obligations in the International Sports Arena, 35 VAL. U. L. REv. 357, 357-60 (2001) (noting
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privacy and "saving face" than with establishing judicial precedent. In
addition, procedural safeguards of the judicial system are largely
unnecessary in communal disputes because the parties generally resolve
disputes informally. Furthermore, they usually share understanding of
applicable rules and norms, and enjoy relatively equal bargaining
68power.
Merchant and trade groups are prime examples of communities that
have benefited from arbitration's private adjudication of disputes. 69 By
the early twentieth century, nearly every trade or profession had
developed arbitration systems that determined intra-community disputes
in accordance with local norms, standards, and rules.70  The New York
Chamber of Commerce, for example, established an arbitral regime at the
Chamber's inception in 1768.71 It even relied on arbitration's privacy
and independence to foster efficient resolution of disputes among
American and British merchants during and after the American
Revolutionary War.72
Merchant groups also have preferred arbitrators' equitable
determinations pursuant to industry norms over courts' legalistic
judgments.73  Arbitrators earn community respect and acceptance by
making determinations based on field-specific knowledge and
expertise.74  Furthermore, arbitrators are not "hemmed in" by legal
communal benefits of arbitrations based on norms and standards in modem international sports
arbitrations).
68. See Earl S. Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L.
REV. 132, 144 (1934) (noting how equitable determinations contributed to peace preservation in
merchant communities).
69. Id. at 134-35; see also LUJO BRENTANO, ON THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF GILDS,
AND THE ORIGIN OF TRADE-UNIONS 33-39 (1870) (highlighting application of "guild law" in
England during Anglo-Saxon times); Mentschikoff, supra note 22, at 850-52 (discussing trade
association's need for convenience and improved certainty of private arbitration systems in which
arbitrators could determine disputes according to trade rules and standards, instead of murky law,
especially in disputes regarding foreign trade).
70. Harry Baum & Leon Pressman, The Enforcement of Commercial Arbitration Agreements in
the Federal Courts, 8 N.Y.U. L. Q. REV. 238, 246-47 (1930) (reporting trade associations' use of
arbitration systems).
71. William Catron Jones, Three Centuries of Commercial Arbitration in New York: A Brief
Survey, 1956 WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 207 (1956).
72. See id. at 208-09 (describing how New York Chamber of Commerce arbitrations continued
during British occupation in 1779, and continued to thrive after the Revolutionary War).
73. See, e.g., id. 211-13 (depicting prevalence of mercantile arbitrations in North America).
74. See id at 161 (noting that traders dating back to the Oxyrynchus Papyri from 427 A.D.
willingly accepted arbitrators' decisions because they were based on understandings and expertise in
the field). For example, construction arbitration has continually thrived since the 1800s primarily
because parties value having their disputes decided by experts in the field. See id. at 215 ("In the
case of construction contracts, it may be that the builder desired that technical disputes be decided by
a technician.").
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precedents because their proceedings are private.75 This also means
arbitrators may order equitable remedies, regardless of judicial
limitations.76
In addition, arbitration's private proceedings allow parties to resolve
their disputes quietly without suffering public embarrassment of
litigation." Trade groups may then encourage compliance with awards
by threatening disclosure that could harm a non-compliant party's
reputation.78 Arbitration has gained prominence in the labor industry, for
example, as a means for fostering self-government and peace
preservation.79 Similarly, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS)
provides the athletic community with means for resolving disputes in
accordance with internal standards and customs. 80 This may include
ordering equitable and creative remedies not available in court. 81 CAS
75. Id. at 149-50.
76. See Oregonian Ry. v. Oregon Ry. & Nay., 37 F. 733, 734 (C.C.D. Or. 1885) (noting
remedial limitations applicable in court).
77. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1785 (2001) (noting arbitrations'
utility in preserving relations in the cotton industry).
78. See Philip J. McConnaughay, Rethinking the Role of Law and Contracts in East-West
Commercial Relationships, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 427, 453 (2001) (noting importance of privacy in
Asian commercial arbitration, and how it may reduce "humiliation and loss of face" associated with
public dispute resolution processes); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Reconstructing Construction Law.
Reality and Reform in a Transactional System, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 463, 481 (noting how construction
disputants benefit from relational values of private processes such as arbitration and mediation); see
also Bernstein, supra note 77, at 1731-34 (explaining cotton industry arbitration's application of
industry-specific terms and rules, and even damage measures that differ from those applied in the
courts).
79. See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala. Inc., 353 U.S. 448, 462-63
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (observing that judicial intervention in arbitration threatened "the
going systems of self-government"). Likewise, trade associations have relied on arbitration's private
and independent process. See Bernstein, supra note 77, at 1725-33 (discussing the cotton industry's
creation of a private legal system (PLS) through its arbitration scheme). Although Professor
Bernstein concludes that industry arbitrators have applied written trade association rules instead of
field-specific norms, she emphasizes the importance of the arbitration system's privacy and
independence in reducing transaction, error, legal system, and collection costs. Id. at 1725; cf,
Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes, and International Commercial
Arbitration, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 79, 81-84 (2000) (offering an empirical rejoinder in the
international arbitration context to Professor Bernstein's critique of reliance on commercial norms in
understanding parties' agreements).
80. The CAS, established by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to resolve private
sports-specific disputes, has been described as "a unifying institution that can help deliver sport back
to its origins," and "can be the unifying body that ensures fairness and integrity in sport through
sound legal control and the administration of diverse laws and philosophies." Richard H. McLaren,
The Court ofArbitration for Sport: An Independent Arena for the World's Sports Disputes, 35 VAL.
U. L. REV. 379, 380-81 (2000). The CAS arbitral scheme applies through association requirements
and contractual incorporation, and is based on widely accepted principles that may some day be
recognized as the "lex sportiva." Id. The CAS serves communal goals in a manner similar to that of
traditional merchant arbitration systems. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text (discussing
growth of arbitration among merchant and trade groups).
81. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 885 P.2d 994, 1005 (Cal. 1994) (holding that
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rules expressly encourage arbitrators to exercise their discretionary
power to provide relief with an eye toward correcting injustice, even
where strict application of the law would prevent just results. 82
Arbitration's privacy also may foster more democratic dispute
resolution than parties experience through litigation by allowing
disputants to build consensus in crafting rules and procedures for their
given contexts.83  Parties are generally free to tailor arbitration
procedures in accordance with shared norms and notions of equity.84
Increased transparency may hinder this flexibility, however, by causing
arbitrators to observe more rigid court-like conventions to satisfy public
expectations and ensure enforceability of awards. 85 Nonetheless, lack of
transparency in arbitration may hinder democratic public participation in
dispute resolution.
86
Accordingly, privacy may benefit consumers and employees with
equitably strong, but legally weak, cases.87  Arbitrators may reach past
legal confines to order remedies that a court may deny.88 Although
evidence is mixed, some studies suggest that this flexibility has allowed
arbitrators may order remedies not available in court). "Were courts to reevaluate independently the
merits of a particular remedy, the parties' contractual expectation of a decision according to the
arbitrators' best judgment would be defeated." Id. at 1001.
82. But see McLaren, supra note 80, at 403-05 (recognizing that the CAS is limited by "the
appropriate legal machinery"). See also Lindland v. U.S. Wrestling Ass'n, 230 F.3d 1036, 1037-39
(7th Cir. 2000) (ordering U.S. Wrestling to certify Lindland as its nominee for the Olympic Games
in accordance with the the re-wrestle ordered by an arbitrator).
83. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer's Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J.
347, 359 (2005) (explaining how private dispute resolution processes may be "closer to direct
democracy models (town meetings) than representative models").
84. See Mentschikoff, supra note 22, at 852-54 (emphasizing application of trade rules and
standards in trade group arbitrations).
85. See Catherine A. Rogers, Regulating International Arbitrators: A Functional Approach to
Developing Standards of Conduct, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 53, 66-68 (2005) (explaining loss of fairness
focus that results from judicialization of arbitration). While substantive review may force arbitrators
to more meticulously analyze cases and apply legal rules, it also may cause arbitrators to shirk
attention to cases because they view their determinations as merely advisory. In addition, non-
lawyers may refuse to arbitrate reviewable arbitrations, diminishing disputants' access to valuable
expert arbitrators.
86. See Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbitration,
67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 279, 298-304 (2004) (discussing reasons why arbitration can be
considered undemocratic).
87. See Harris v. Parker Coll. of Chiropractic, 286 F.3d 790, 793-94 (5th Cir. 2002) (enforcing
an expanded review provision in an employment contract, but narrowly construing the clause against
the employer who drafted the clause to encompass only pure questions of law and thus preserve the
arbitrator's factual, equitable determination); Hughes Training Inc. v. Cook, 254 F.3d 588, 595 (5th
Cir. 2001) (vacating $200,000 arbitration award for an employee on an emotional distress claim
pursuant to a clause in the arbitration agreement calling for substantive judicial review of the award).
88. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 885 P.2d 994, 1005 (Cal. 1994) (explaining
arbitrator discretion and benefits of arbitration as a means to obtain equitable and creative relief not
otherwise available in court).
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employees to enjoy higher win rates in arbitration than litigation.89
Furthermore, reports have indicated that investors may obtain more
favorable results in NASD arbitrations than in court, possibly because
arbitrators focus more on providing equitable outcomes than applying
strict legal rules that make fraud claims particularly difficult to assert. 90
Indeed, privacy fueled courts' envy, distrust, and refusal to enforce
arbitration agreements, 9' and this refusal led Congress to enact the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).92
2. Promotion of Efficiency in Arbitration
Privacy also may benefit the parties by fostering faster and cheaper
dispute resolution than parties experience in litigation. Everyone may
save time and money when they resolve their disputes without the
prolonged financial and personal strife caused by trial and judicial
appeals. 93 In addition, arbitrators may deliver awards more quickly and
89. Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims.
An Empirical Comparison, DISP. RESOL. J. at 44, 45 (Nov. 2003-Jan. 2004) (finding arbitrated
outcomes did not materially differ from trial outcomes in cases between employers and highly paid
employees); Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate Over Predispute
Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 559, 563-65 (2001)
(compiling timing and win rate information in employment arbitration and concluding that evidence
suggests that claimants win more cases in arbitration then they do in litigation); Elizabeth Hill, Due
Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the
American Arbitration Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 777, 808, 810 (2003) (finding
data regarding arbitrated outcomes in study of employment arbitrations under AAA's fairly pro-
employee rules did not reveal bias against employees); Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice:
Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 46-49 (1998) (finding
that employees win 63% of their claims in arbitration and only 15% of their claims in litigation).
90. Gretchen Morgenson, Why Investors May Find Arbitrators on Their Side, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
19, 2001, at Cl. To the surprise of brokers who believed that arbitration would curb investor claims,
it has been reported that arbitrators' flexibility and focus on equity has benefited some investors. Id.
For example, an investor must prove intent on the broker's part to establish a fraud claim in federal
court, while in arbitration, panels have ruled against firms for recommending poor investments to
clients or for failing to supervise brokers, without requiring proof of intent to defraud. Id. In
addition, in federal court, only investors that have bought or sold based on a broker's
recommendation may sue for fraud, whereas arbitrators have allowed claims by investors that held
on to stock due to an analyst's call. Id. Morgenson concludes that in arbitration, many claimants
receive at least some portion of their demands in cases that probably would have failed in court. Id.
91. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENERAL BUSINESS AND LEGAL FORMS 205 (Clarence F. Birdseye
ed., 1924) (emphasizing common law courts' jealousy and opposition to arbitration, despite their
enforcement of other contracts); Charles Newton Hulvey, Arbitration of Commercial Disputes, 15
VA. L. REV. 238, 238-39 (1929) (stating reasons courts did not enforce arbitration agreements).
92. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000); IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica, Inc., 103 F.3d 524, 528 (7th
Cir. 1996) (emphasizing that the FAA represents "Congress's emphatically expressed support for
facilitating arbitration in order to effectuate private ordering and lighten the caseload of the federal
courts").
93. See Harry J. Dworkin, Arbitration: An Obvious Solution to a Crowded Docket, 29 CLEV. B.
ASS'N J. 167, 167-68 (1958) (advocating binding arbitration as a means to resolve disputes in much
less time than the two to three years it took from litigation commencement to trial in state and
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generate lower fees and costs when they need not write reasoned
opinions.94 This is one of the efficiency benefits the Supreme Court has
noted in promoting strict enforcement of arbitration agreements. 95
Increased transparency may hinder these efficiency benefits,
however, by fostering "judicialized" arbitration proceedings. This occurs
when arbitrators seek to protect the enforceability of their proceedings
under increased scrutiny by infusing proceedings with court-like
formalities, rules, and procedures. 96 Some nonetheless argue for greater
review of arbitration proceedings to ensure minimal fairness of
arbitration imposed on "little guys"97  such as employees and
consumers.98 More review, however, may harm these little guys by
adding to costs of arbitration, which companies may pass on to
federal courts).
94. See Christopher B. Kaczmarek, Public Law Deserves Public Justice. Why Public Law
Arbitrators Should Be Required to Issue Written, Publishable Opinions, 4 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y
J. 285, 297-99 (2000) (opinion writing adds time and costs to the arbitration process, thus
commercial arbitrators generally do not write opinions).
95. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995) (basing pro-
arbitration policy on the assumption arbitration is "usually cheaper and faster than litigation; it can
have simpler procedural and evidentiary rules; it normally minimizes hostility and is less disruptive
of ongoing and future business dealings among the parties; it is often more flexible in regard to
scheduling of times and places of hearings and discovery devices") (quoting H.R. REP. No. 97-542,
at 13 (1982)); Smoothline Ltd. v. N. Am. Foreign Trading, 249 F.3d 147, 148 (2d Cir. 2001)
(emphasizing arbitration as "a speedy and relatively inexpensive trial before specialists"); Ariz. Elec.
Power Coop. v. Berkeley, 59 F.3d 988, 992 (9th Cir. 1995) (touting efficiency and simplicity as
arbitration's key benefits); Sverdrup Corp. v. WHC Constructors, Inc., 989 F.2d 148, 152 (4th Cir.
1993) (same).
96. The "judicialization" of arbitration has been widely debated. Compare, e.g., Bruce M.
Selya, Arbitration Unbound?: The Legacy of McMahon, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 1433, 1454-57 (1996)
(questioning over-judicialization of securities arbitration through increased discovery, written
opinions, and other added procedures) with Edward Brunet, Toward Changing Models of Securities
Arbitration, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 1459, 1485-93 (arguing that perceived judicialization of securities
arbitration would improve the process; but nonetheless indicating discomfort with directing a court
to substantively review arbitration awards).
97. See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 637 (1996) (discussing companies'
inclusion of arbitration clauses in their contracts with consumers, employees, franchisees, and other
"little guys").
98. See id. at 686-93 (suppliers generally are free to impose arbitration clauses that take
advantage of consumers because consumers are unlikely to be informed about the existence or
meaning of arbitration provisions); see generally Sarah Rudolph Cole, Uniform Arbitration: "One
Size Fits All" Does Not Fit, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 759 (2001) (proposing that employees
likely do not expend limited resources reading, understanding, or negotiating arbitration clauses);
Geraldine Szott Moohr, Opting in or Opting Out: The New Legal Process or Arbitration, 77 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1087 (1999) (discussing unfairness of arbitration in traditionally non-merchant contexts).
Concerns regarding one-sided arbitration agreements are not new, and in fact arose at common law.
See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION,
INTERNATIONALIZATION 68-71 (1992) ("one-sided" and "mandatory" arbitration agreements raise
important concerns regarding arbitration's consensuality). Again, it seems this debate would benefit
from a clarified understanding of arbitration's finality under the current FAA/UAA scheme.
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consumers through decreased wages/benefits or increased prices/rates.99
Furthermore, parties with little financial resources may be unable to fund
the expenses of judicialized arbitration procedures, let alone launch
substantive post-award appeals. 100 Little guys also may be harmed when
their sensitive information becomes public due to increased judicial
review of arbitration proceedings. In addition, it is unclear that increased
review would even lead to "better" awards.' 0 ' Increased scrutiny of
arbitration also would impose additional costs on notoriously scant
resources of courts and other public agencies.10
2
B. Drawbacks of Privacy
1. Abuse of Arbitration's "Cozy" Atmosphere
The privacy of arbitration also creates the risk that those with power
will take advantage of arbitration's "cozy" process. They may use it to
intimidate opponents who are emotionally sensitive or vulnerable to the
stresses of participating in a dispute resolution process. This is
especially true when a party does not have legal representation or is
unfamiliar with the arbitration process.
Consider, for example, the understandable emotion of a sexual
harassment claimant who must assert sensitive claims in a fairly small
99. See Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer
Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DIsP. RESOL. 89, 93 (2001) (attempts to make arbitration more
"fair" to consumers through judicialization of proceedings often results in increased business costs
that are passed on to the populace through higher prices); Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as
Exceptional Consumer Law (With a Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE
L. REv. 195, 211-13 (1998) (discussing cost savings of efficient arbitration in consumer transactions,
and how savings may be passed on to consumers through lower prices and better product quality).
100. See Michael Heise, Justice Delayed?: An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case Disposition
Time, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 813, 843 (2000) ("Non-individuals--especially corporate parties-
enjoy [generally] greater access than individuals to the economic resources necessary" to "litigate
with more vigor and for a longer period of time."). A 1992 U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics survey of state courts indicated that involvement of non-individual defendants in litigation
generally resulted in longer trials. Id. at 842-43. See also Theodore 0. Rogers, Jr., The Procedural
Differences Between Litigation in Court and Arbitration: Who Benefits?, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DtsP.
RESOL. 633, 640 (2001) (comparing costs and benefits of arbitration and litigation in employment
cases, and concluding that "[tihere are real advantages for employees in the arbitration process" but
that employers may nonetheless opt for arbitration because it offers more certainty).
101. See Moohr, supra note 98, at 1093 (noting that substantive judicial review of arbitration
may be too burdensome for non-commercial disputants); Ware, supra note 19, at 711-12 (discussing
lack of evidence that "plaintiffs 'do worse' in arbitration than they would have done in court").
102. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Belco Petroleum Corp., 88 F.3d 129, 133
(2d Cir. 1996) (emphasizing that one of arbitration's key advantages is that it "helps to relieve
crowded court dockets"); Mobil Oil Indon. Inc. v. Asamera Oil (Indon.) Ltd., 372 N.E.2d 21, 23
(N.Y. 1977) (stressing that judicial intrusion in arbitration must be limited in order to conserve the
time and resources of both the courts and the parties).
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conference room. The claimant may have to assert and explain claims
while sitting across a narrow table from the asserted harasser, who also
may be the claimant's boss. In addition, traditionally flexible arbitration
procedures do not provide the decorum, or "buffer," of judicial rules.
Furthermore, arbitration rules generally do not require arbitrators to
intercede voluntarily to protect claimants from intimidation, leaving
claimants vulnerable to targeted attacks on a claimant's sensitivities.
Moreover, effects of such intimidation may go unchecked by the limited
judicial review the FAA allows.
A courtroom trial, in contrast, generally is open to public scrutiny
and takes place in a less intimate setting. That said, courtrooms are often
very intimidating, and perhaps more frightening than arbitration rooms.
Judicial procedures, however, provide a "buffer" between claimants and
defendants.10 3 Those with sensitive claims, therefore, may prefer courts'
open but protective procedures to arbitration's private process.
2. Private Opinion's Prevention of Public Access to Information
Some criticize arbitration's absence of published opinions because it
impinges development of public law and the public's access to
information that may affect civic interests.10 4 Arbitrators may save time
and costs by not writing reasoned opinions to explain their awards, but
this also allows for privatization of the law. Naked awards also fail to
provide the parties with direction regarding future behavior.
Enforcement of these naked awards is generally proper, however,
because arbitrators usually seek to reach just results and the parties
should be bound by their contracts to forego trial for arbitration.
The lack of published opinions is nonetheless troubling with respect
to discrimination, consumer protection, and other claims affecting public
health or safety. 05 This is because published opinions benefit the public
103. For example, courts may limit the scope of discovery and medical examinations, as well as
the admissibility of evidence of sexual behavior or predisposition. See, e.g., Vinson v. Superior
Court, 740 P.2d 404, 411-14 (Cal. 1987) (finding that sexual harassment claimant did not waive her
right to sexual privacy by filing suit, and ordering trial court to limit scope of claimant's mental
examination); Paul Nicholas Monnin, Proving Welcomeness: The Admissibility of Evidence of
Sexual History in Sexual Harassment Claims Under the 1994 Amendments to Federal Rule of
Evidence 412, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1155, 1160 (1995) (explaining how judicial rules may allow courts
to limit evidence of sexual behavior or predisposition in civil and criminal proceedings).
104. See Moohr, supra note 98, at 1093-97 (claiming that judicial adjudication, in contrast to
arbitration, can stimulate legal development and create public values largely because courts
communicate with each other and the public through recorded opinions).
105. See Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial
Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 267, 318
(1995) (arguing that arbitration denies consumers statutory protections due to limited discovery, lack
of class action procedures, and absence of written opinions or other means "for transmitting data to
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by aiding development of law, and providing information regarding
products' safety, companies' legal violations, and other public policies.
Courts' opinions become public record, and may spark further
investigations and policy initiatives.' 6  Without such exposure,
manufacturers may exert influence over government agencies charged
with protecting product safety and control media reporting regarding
their products. 10 7  Commentators have responded that the civil justice
system "is eminently equipped to expose manufacturers who manipulate
and hide behind the law."'
10 8
For example, the courts played an important role in exposing the
inadequacy of fabric flammability standards. 10 9 The textile industry
essentially controlled the development and application of weak safety
regulations under the 1953 Flammable Fabrics Act. 110 These weak
regulations, in turn, allowed Riegel Textile Corporation to market its
flannelette, which complied with regulations but was in fact
flammable.11  It was not until consumers prosecuted court claims
regarding flammable children's clothing in the 1980s that the public
became aware of the flammability regulations' inadequacies and
companies' manipulations of these regulations." 12 Moreover, the court's
published rulings for consumers on these claims publicly reprimanded
the industry. The court declared that it was ordering punitive damages
"to expose this type of gross misconduct, punish those manufacturers
guilty of such flagrant misbehavior, and deter all manufacturers from
acting with similar disregard for the public welfare."
' 13
regulatory and enforcement agencies"); Moohr, supra note 98, at 1093-97 (attributing statutory
prohibitions on sexual discrimination, in part, to the open processes ofjudicial adjudication). Some
institutional rules, however, do require publication of some awards. See, e.g., Meredith W. Nissen,
Class Action Arbitrations, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2005, at 19, 21 (explaining AAA class
arbitration rules requiring that reasoned awards be made publicly available); Notice of Filing of
Proposed Rule Change to Provide Written Explanations in Arbitration Awards, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-52009, 70 Fed. Reg. 41,065 (July 11, 2005) (building on current NASD award
publication, and proposing amendments allowing parties to require that these awards include
reasoned opinions).
106. See Christopher Placitella & Justin Klein, The Civil Justice System Bridges the Great
Divide in Consumer Protection, 43 DUQ. L. REv. 219, 223-35 (2005) (emphasizing uneven power
structure in pharmaceutical cases and the need for civil litigation to protect consumer interests).
107. See id. at 220 (quoting Dr. David Graham, the associate Director of Science and Medicine
in the FDA's Office of Drug Safety, that "[w]e are virtually defenseless" in guarding ourselves from
unsafe pharmaceuticals in light of the industry's influence over the FDA and the media).
108. Id. at 231.
109. Id. at231-33.
110. Id. at232.
111. Id. at 232-33.
112. Id..
113. Id. at 233 (quoting Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 732 (Minn. 1980)).
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If this case had been arbitrated, the dangers of flannelette may have
escaped public scrutiny, especially because the product passed industry
sponsored government regulations. The published opinion established
manufacturers' liability, and the open trial process alerted the public of
significant safety issues. This, in turn, mobilized public demand for
regulatory changes and accountability. If the plaintiffs had agreed to
arbitrate all claims related to the flannelette, however, there would have
been no public trial with media access, and the process would have
ended with no published opinion. Furthermore, arbitration rules or
agreement provisions may have precluded the arbitrators and parties
from disclosing information about the arbitration.
An area where arbitration's privacy has shielded access to safety
information is in manufactured home ("MH") cases.' 14  MH
manufacturers and lenders routinely include binding arbitration
provisions in their "take-it-or-leave-it" form sales and financing
contracts. 1 5  Furthermore, courts' general enforcement of these
arbitration provisions under the FAA' 16 has allowed MH insiders
essentially to effectuate pro-industry private law." 7  It also allows
consumer claims to escape public attention, and hinders development of
warranty, lending, and other consumer protection law. 118  This is
especially true because the MH industry's interest group, the
Manufactured Home Institute (MHI), has controlled the Department of
Housing and Urban Development's creation of MH safety standards, and
MH insiders routinely include warranty limitations in their form
contracts." 19 This may allow MH insiders to impose housing rules that
114. See Amy J. Schmitz, Mobile-Home Mania? Protecting Procedurally Fair Arbitration in a
Consumer Microcosm, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 291, 371 (2005) (discussing privacy in MH
warranty arbitration).
115. See id at 314-16 (describing prevalence of arbitration clauses and one-sided bargaining in
MH transactions).
116. Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
117. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89-90 (2000) (finding MH consumer
failed to meet burden of proving prohibitive arbitration costs, and therefore enforcing arbitration
provision in financing contract); Schmitz, supra note 114, at 313-14 (explaining private lawmaking
in MH contexts).
118. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Fleetwood Homes of Ga., Inc., 253 F.3d 611, 613 n. 1 (11th Cir.
2001) (involving broad arbitration clause in MH sales contract, covering all claims "arising out of or
in any way relating" to sale of MH and negotiations leading to sale, including contract, warranty,
and tort, and expressly inuring to the benefit of third parties).
119. See David V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 371, 410-11 (2003). See also
Celeste M. Hammond, The (Pre) (As)sumed "Consent" of Commercial Binding Arbitration
Contracts: An Empirical Study of Attitudes and Expectations of Transactional Lawyers, 36 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 589, 604-09 (2003) (discussing the 'myth' of voluntariness" of pre-dispute
arbitration agreements in employment and consumer contracts).
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harm MH consumers and public policy promoting safe and affordable
housing.
120
3. Privacy's Augmentation of Repeat Player Advantages
This lack of transparency also may augment repeat player advantages
of arbitration. Powerful parties enjoy advantages in selecting arbitrators
and presenting their cases. 121  Corporate employers, for example,
generally have legal teams that gather information about arbitrators,
whereas employees often lack access to such information. 
122
Furthermore, repeat players may then augment arbitration's privacy with
pro-drafter confidentiality provisions effectually to ensure that the public
will not learn about claims against them. This may include violations
affecting public interests, such as employment discrimination and
manufacturing laws. Arbitral privacy thus saves these defendants from
unfavorable public relations of trial and hinders individuals' abilities to
gather evidence of habitual offenses or patterns of illegal conduct.
Moreover, federal pro-arbitration jurisprudence preempts state
attempts to curb these advantages by treating arbitration differently than
other contracts or otherwise hindering enforcement of arbitration. 23 For
example, a state could not require separate notice and consent for
arbitration clauses in form contracts. 124  Federal law thus permits
companies to use form arbitration clauses to remove disputes against
them from the public judicial system without clear consent of the other
participants, let alone the public that may be affected by the disputes.
125
In this way, these companies may effectively impose their own brands of
privatized justice. 126
120. Contracting communities have used arbitration as an effective tool in cultivating private law
that efficiently regulates their intra-relations. See Bernstein, supra note 77, at 1724, 1744-45, 1785
(discussing cotton merchant community's creation of a private legal system (PLS) through which the
community has succeeded in minimizing transaction, legal system, and collection costs); Snyder
supra note 119, at 402-03 (discussing Professor Bernstein's findings regarding the diamond
industry's self-regulation through arbitration). For example, cotton merchants have relied on
tribunals' application of private rules and norms to promote cooperation and commercial stability
and efficiency. Bernstein, supra note 77, at 1756.
121. See Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of
Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REv. 185, 218-20 (noting disproportionate benefits repeat players
derive from confidentiality in arbitration).
122. Id.
123. Margaret L. Moses, Privatized "Justice", 36 LOY. U. CHi. L.J. 535, 535-40, 546-48
(2005).
124. See id. at 545-47 (providing example).
125. Id. at 547.
126. Id.
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Some courts have recognized these repeat player advantages in
holding arbitration provisions unconscionable under general contract
law. 127 In Acorn v. Household International, Inc., for example, the court
emphasized the repeat player advantages of arbitration in finding that
AAA arbitration rules incorporated in the arbitration clauses in the
claimants' loan contracts were unconscionable in part because they
allowed arbitrators to hold closed hearings and required that awards be
kept confidential.1 28  The court concluded that such secrecy unduly
favored defendants because it allowed them to prevent "the scrutiny
critical to mitigating [repeat player] advantages."' 
29
Similarly, a court assessing another lender's arbitration form found a
provision preventing disclosure of the award was not necessarily
objectionable, but contributed to the overall unconscionability of the
arbitration provision. 130 The court recognized that "repeat arbitration
participants enjoy advantages over one-time participants" that magnify
the disproportionate effects of the provision, shielding any award from
public disclosure.131
The same was true with respect to the confidentiality provision the
court assessed in Ting v. AT&T. 132 In that case, the court found that the
127. See Randall, supra note 121, at 218-20 (concluding that the majority of courts find
confidentiality provisions in one-sided arbitration agreements unconscionable). These courts that
object to arbitration's secrecy generally do not focus solely on unconscionability of confidentiality
provisions in arbitration, but note disproportionate burdens of these provisions in the context of
agreements with many one-sided provisions. See Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465,
1476-77 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting how lack of disclosure would prevent potential claimants from
gathering information about the company's patterns of statutory violations, in the course of
critiquing cost, arbitrator selection, and other provisions in the arbitration agreement that favored the
company over employees). Furthermore, courts split regarding Cole's application, and the
acceptability of confidentiality and privacy in arbitration. Compare, Parilla v. lAP Worldwide
Servs. VI., 368 F.3d 269, 271-72, 279-81 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding confidentiality provisions in
employment agreement not unconscionable, and interpreting Cole to support its conclusion) with
Lloyd v. Hovensa L.L.C., 243 F. Supp. 2d 346, 350-52 (D.V.I. 2003) (citing Cole in holding
confidentiality provision restricting publication of parties' identities unconscionable in employment
context), rev'd, 369 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2004) (reversing this finding based on the Parilla court's
finding that the AAA confidentiality and privacy rules were not unconscionable).
128. Acorn v. Household Int'l, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
129. Id. Nonetheless, the court should have at least considered whether confidentiality of
awards would have benefited the claimants as well by shielding any personal financial information
contained in the awards. See also Lloyd, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 352-53 (finding restriction on
publication of parties' identities unconscionable because it disproportionately favored repeat players
by preventing potential plaintiffs from building cases of intentional misconduct or patterns of
discrimination), rev'd, 369 F.3d 263, 275 (3d Cir. 2004) (reversing this finding based on Parilla, 368
F.3d at 279-80).
130. Luna v. Household Fin. Corp. 111, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1180-81 (W.D. Wash. 2002).
131. Id. at 1181.
132. 319 F.3d 1126, 1133, 1149-52 (9th Cir. 2003). The secrecy provision stated, "[a]ny
arbitration shall remain confidential. Neither you nor AT&T may disclose the existence, content or
results of any arbitration or award, except as may be required by law or to confirm and enforce an
award." Id. at 1152 n.16.
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confidentiality provision in AT&T's form arbitration clause in the
Consumer Services Agreement ("CSA") contributed to the clause's
unconscionability because AT&T's routine use of this clause allowed it
to potentially prevent seven million Californians from obtaining
information regarding prior claims. This included evidence consumers
would need to prove intentional misconduct or unlawful
discrimination. 133 It also would have permitted AT&T to continue to
"accumulate[] a wealth of knowledge on how to negotiate the terms of its
own unilaterally crafted contract."
' 134
Nonetheless, many courts deny or ignore the repeat player
advantages of arbitration's privacy. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, for example, concluded that the confidentiality
provisions incorporated in an employment agreement were not
unconscionable.1 35 Instead, the court opined that the provisions did not
favor the employer or in any way impede the employee's ability to obtain
relief on her Title VII claims, let alone future claimants' ability to prove
such statutory claims.' 36  This court thus exemplified the federal pro-
arbitration and pro-privacy trend, which seems to be growing as courts
happily cull their dockets.'
37
IV. DISPROPORTIONATE EFFECTS OF CONFIDENTIALITY CONFUSION
Secrecy may benefit all parties in arbitration, especially in corporate
disputes involving intellectual property and other business secrets.
Nonetheless, misconceptions and confusion about confidentiality in
arbitration may lead individuals without arbitration experience to become
subject to arbitration clauses without understanding how privacy and
pro-drafter confidentiality provisions may work to their disadvantage. 1
38
Repeat players generally draft confidentiality agreements to protect the
secrecy of unfavorable claims and awards, while individuals without
arbitration resources, experience, or understanding may leave their
personal information vulnerable to disclosure.' 39  These individuals
133. Id.at1152.
134. Id. The court's holding may have been the impetus for AT&T re-writing its confidentiality
provision. Id. at 1152 n.16. The court does not provide the revised confidentiality provision.
135. Parilla v. lAP Worldwide Servs. VI, 368 F.3d 269, 279-80 (3d Cir. 2004).
136. Id. at 280-82.
137. See Moses, supra note 123, at 546-48 (critiquing privatized justice). See also Iberia Credit
Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless L.L.C., 379 F.3d 159, 175-76 (5th Cir. 2004) (upholding validity
of confidentiality provision requiring secrecy of existence and results of arbitration, especially in
light of federal policy favoring arbitration as a trade-off of the procedures of the courtroom).
138. Randall, supra note 121, at 218-19.
139. See id. at 218-20 (discussing pro-drafter confidentiality provisions in arbitration contracts).
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generally do not realize the need or have the resources to take the
necessary steps to protect the confidentiality of their personal
information.) 40  In addition, these individuals generally cannot compete
with corporate power to control the disclosure of information after
arbitration, and may be left wishing they had contractually protected
themselves.
A. Inadequate Confidentiality Protection
Parties may agree to confidentiality provisions in their arbitration
contracts that preclude them from disclosing information about any
arbitration proceedings to third parties. The scope of these
confidentiality provisions varies with respect to the information and
people they cover. In addition, confidentiality provisions usually extend
to only those who accept them. This means witnesses and others who are
not parties to an arbitration contract containing confidentiality provisions
may disclose information about an arbitration proceeding unless they
separately agree to keep this information secret.
Such confidentiality contracts are nonetheless rare. In one study,
researchers found confidentiality provisions in only 13.5% of the
arbitration clauses studied. 14 1  In addition, contracting oversights and
realities of uneven bargaining power often result in non-existent or
inadequate confidentiality protections for individuals. 42  Instead,
confidentiality provisions generally benefit companies who routinely
arbitrate their disputes, even when the provisions appear neutral. 143 Such
repeat players draft form provisions to protect their interests, but leave
individuals' sensitive information subject to disclosure. 44 For example,
the AAA's confidentiality clause which some companies adopt neutrally
prohibits disclosure of "the existence, content, or results" of
140. See Gibbons, supra note 65, at 772-73 (explaining that arbitral awards may develop
"common law" in areas saturated by form arbitration clauses, and that repeat players may control
this law if they can "selectively choose" what information to disclose about their arbitrations).
141. Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, " Volunteering" to Arbitrate Through Predispute
Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 69
(2004). The study also found that most arbitration clauses contain fairly even-handed terms, but
may operate to the undue advantage of repeat players. Id. at 72-73.
142. See, e.g., Randall, supra note 121, at 218-20 (discussing one-sided nature of disclosure
provisions).
143. Id. See also Demaine & Hensler, supra note 141, at 71-73 (finding that even if consumer
arbitration contracts appear to contain fair terms, this is often deceptive because limited discovery,
claim carve-outs, cost-splitting, and other facially neutral provisions generally disadvantage
consumers who enter the arbitration process without legal experience or resources).
144. See Gibbons, supra note 65, at 780-83 (emphasizing the growing use of arbitration clauses
in form contracts involving disparate power relationships in online contracting).
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arbitration, 45  but neglects to clearly protect confidentiality of
individuals' personal information revealed during the proceedings.
Moreover, the clause would not prevent attendees at the arbitration from
reporting their experiences.
Similarly, one large lender's form arbitration clause required the
parties to keep any award confidential, but did not ensure that a
borrower's financial information revealed in arbitration would remain
secret.' 46  The clause also augmented the lender's repeat player
advantages by barring class actions or consolidation, preserving the
lender's rights to seek judicial foreclosure, and creating the risk that a
borrower's arbitration costs would be at least ten times those of a court
proceeding. 147
One-time participants are unlikely to have the experience or
resources to effectively negotiate for terms protecting their
confidentiality interests in arbitration. 48  Consumers, for example,
generally do not realize what rights they have waived through an
arbitration clause until after a dispute arises.1 49 They also may assume
their personal information is automatically confidential, and are unlikely
to understand how pro-drafter confidentiality terms may impact issues
affecting the public's interests. For example, individuals' personal
financial information may be revealed in an arbitration involving
securities or debt, and thus become subject to unwanted disclosure. The
same may be true for an employee who must reveal sensitive information
during arbitration of a sexual harassment claim.
Furthermore, these claimants should not assume that arbitrators will
use their evidentiary or procedural powers to preclude admissibility or
protect confidentiality of such information. Instead, arbitrators generally
have wide discretion in deciding admissibility of evidence, and failure to
apply a claimed privilege will rarely provide grounds for vacating an
arbitration award. 150  In addition, standard arbitration contracts often
145. DRAHOZAL, supra note 14, at 425.
146. Luna v. Household Fin. Corp. 1ll, 236 F. Supp. 2d I166, 1171-72, 1178-82 (W.D. Wash.
2002).
147. Id. at172,1178-82.
148. See Gibbons, supra note 65, at 780-81 (noting reasons why consumers generally do not
realize the significance of arbitration clauses, especially when the clauses incorporate institutional
rules by reference); Demaine & Hensler, supra note 141, at 73-74 (concluding from a study of
arbitration clauses that consumers generally become bound by arbitration agreements without truly
"agreeing" to them).
149. Demaine & Hensler, supra note 141, at 73-74 (emphasizing that consumers lack
information and experience to appreciate the rights they have waived in pre-dispute contracts).
150. See Rhoades v. United States, 953 F. Supp. 203, 205 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (noting how the
arbitrator overruled Rhoades's claim that her medical records were protected by doctor-patient
privilege); Chiarella v. Viscount Indus., No. 92 Civ. 9310 (RPP), 1993 WL 497967, at *2, *4
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affirm arbitrators' power to conduct hearings and admit evidence as they
deem appropriate, and do not require compliance with evidentiary and
privilege rules applicable in court. 151 Accordingly, individuals should
not passively assume that their personal information is safe from
disclosure.
B. Disproportionate Publicity Regarding Arbitration
The public usually learns very little about arbitrated cases because
any arbitration awards that may become public during judicial
confirmation proceedings generally state nothing more than claim denials
or dollar amounts due.15 2  Some companies have therefore used
arbitration's privacy to prevent disclosure regarding consumer protection
violations, smarmy financial dealings, or other unsavory conduct.
153
Focus Europe reporters found in their survey of international contract
and treaty arbitrations that a peek inside arbitrations revealed corruption,
bribery, and other bad acts. One reporter concluded, "[t]o open a
window on arbitration is to shed light on the good, the bad, and the ugly
in international business."'
15 4
Nonetheless, when information about arbitrated cases becomes
public, it tends to favor more powerful parties. This is because
companies with well-staffed public relations departments may selectively
issue press releases emphasizing their arbitration victories, and otherwise
casting arbitration outcomes to favor their positions."' This may
encourage arbitrators to follow these pro-company awards in future
proceedings, and dissuade injured parties from pursuing claims against
these powerful companies. There is usually little to counter pro-
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1993) (rejecting Chiarella's challenge of an arbitration award on the basis that the
arbitrators improperly rejected ordering in camera review of allegedly privileged documents, finding
that this was "arguably within the arbitrators' powers"), modified on other grounds, 1994 WL
116010 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1994). But see Richard M. Mosk & Tom Ginsburg, Evidentiary
Privileges in International Arbitration, 50 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 345, 345-46, 381-83 (2001)
(acknowledging that evidentiary rules generally do not apply in arbitration, but arguing that
international arbitrators usually should accede to good faith claims of privilege valid under the law
of the locale with the closest connection to the case).
151. See LAWRENCE R. AHERN III & NANCY F. MACLEAN, WEST'S LEGAL FORMS §13.13 (2d
ed. 1994) (providing arbitration form suggesting such affirmation of broad arbitrator power, but no
confidentiality protection for individuals' personal information).
152. Budnitz, supra note 105, at 313 (explaining how "the most that a successful consumer can
report to the press is an award of X dollars," which lacks the effects of a reasoned opinion).
153. See Gibbons, supra note 65, at 783 (noting courts' limited understanding of the extent of
repeat player advantages).
154. Sneak Peek, supra note 16, at 25 (reporting bad cases of bribery with respect to contracts
involving projects in developing nations).
155. Id. (emphasizing that consumers usually lack the sophistication and resources needed to
spark press publication of stories about their arbitrated cases).
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company press, however, due to individuals' lack of organizational,
financial or political clout to publicize their views of arbitrated cases.1
5 6
For example, PR Newswire published Knight Trading Group, Inc.'s
press release announcing a NASD arbitration panel's dismissal of an
employee's improper termination and "whistleblower" claims against his
employer, Knight Securities, L.P. (KSLP). 157  The former employee
alleged that KSLP had deceitfully traded stock and fired him for
asserting these allegations. Notably, PR Newswire's published report
stated that KSLP expected that it would be "vindicated," and touted the
corporation's "client-focused strategies" and "comprehensive trade
execution services in equities and derivatives."' 58 The report emphasized
the NASD's arbitral award as a final and effectually non-reviewable
victory for KSLP, only mentioning as an aside that the award required
KSLP to pay the former employee $19,101.00 it owed him for 2000.15 9
C. Policy Effects of Faulty Assumptions About Arbitration's Secrecy
Arbitration supporters and critics often advance shortsighted policies
based on rushed conclusions about arbitral secrecy. Many arbitration
supporters assume that restrictions on arbitration's privacy would impede
the use of arbitration, and its promise for providing more efficient
dispute resolution than trials provide. 160  They also defend arbitral
secrecy as being no different than secrecy in mediation and settlement
negotiations.
61
Meanwhile, many critics of arbitration target arbitral secrecy as
merely means for repeat players to hide their legal problems from the
156. For example, PR Newswire published Nymox Pharmaceutical Corporation's favorable
statement regarding its settlement of securities claims being arbitrated and litigated, but there was no
claimant response or less favorable account of the settlement. See Nymox Announces Positive
Settlements of Outstanding Litigation, BUS. WIRE, Aug. 12, 2004, LEXIS, Nexis Library, BWIRE
File (publishing Nymox Pharmaceutical Corp.'s press release announcing its settlement of judicial
and arbitral claims asserted against the company and its plan to pursue its "many promising product
development programs"). A search for "nymox w/30 arbitra! AND date (geq (8/1/04) and leq
(8/31/04))" in the Lexis database, "News, Most Recent Two Years (English, Full Text)" revealed no
other reports. See search conducted on July 14, 2005, by David Blower, research assistant to Amy
Schmitz, on file with author.
157. See Knight Announces Successful Conclusions of Dispute Resolution Arbitration With
Former Employee, PR NEWSWIRE, Sept. 23, 2004, LEXIS, Nexis Library, PRNEWS File
[hereinafter Knight Press Release] (publishing press release verbatim). See also Ann Davis, Knight
Trading Wins Dismissal of Case Involving Whistle-Blower, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2004, at C3
(providing KSLP's remarks, but including some comment by the employee).
158. Id..
159. Id.
160. See Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 11, at 70-75 (discussing alleged justifications for
arbitration's privacy).
161. Randall, supra note 121, at 220-21.
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public and future claimants. Some courts also subscribe to this view, and
seem to overlook how confidentiality may benefit individuals. In the
Ting case discussed above, 162 for example, some consumer claimants
may have benefited from the confidentiality provision to the extent its
protection of "content" of arbitration may have prevented anyone
involved from using or otherwise disclosing consumers' financial or
other personal information. 163  Furthermore, some sexual harassment
claimants, and others with sensitive claims, would not assert those claims
without ensured arbitral secrecy.164
In reality, secrecy does not necessarily exist in arbitration and not all
secrecy is "good" or "bad" for anyone. Instead, parties must draft
contracts and policymakers must develop arbitration reforms that take
into account how secrecy can help and harm all parties, as well as the
public. Individuals should be concerned with confidentiality of their
personal information. With expansion of technology, growth of
corporate use of personal information, and epidemic identity theft,
individuals must be careful to ensure the secrecy of their personal
information revealed in presenting arbitration claims and proving
damages. The debate regarding secrecy in arbitration, therefore, must
include consideration of how confidentiality may protect these
vulnerable parties.
In addition, policymakers should consider the different roles
confidentiality plays in arbitration versus mediation, negotiation, and
other non-binding dispute resolution processes. There are good reasons
why these non-binding processes are generally more confidential than
arbitration. These processes only end disputes if the parties reach
settlements, whereas binding arbitration necessarily ends the parties'
disputes and thus replaces trials.' 65  Laws and administrative rules
generally protect confidentiality of non-binding processes because it
promotes candor, and therefore efficacy, of these processes. Without this
protection, parties to non-binding processes may hold back information
out of concern that the information will be disclosed or used in trial.
Arbitrating parties, in contrast, have incentive to present all relevant
162. See supra text accompanying notes 132-34.
163. Perhaps the secrecy provision would not have had that effect, but the court should have at
least considered the consumers' interests in confidentiality and the possibility of balancing the
provision.
164. See Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 11, at 71 (noting pros of arbitration's privacy).
165. Randall, supra note 121, at 220-21. See also, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42
F.3d 1299, 1304-05 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding sexual harassment claimant did not have to arbitrate her
claims under an arbitration clause in her employment contract because remedies and procedural
protections, including privacy rights of sexual harassment victims under California judicial rules,
would not necessarily apply in arbitration).
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information to the arbitrators because they know it is their only shot in
presenting their cases.
Complete secrecy is therefore not as essential in arbitration as it is in
non-binding processes. Instead, arbitral secrecy may go too far in
precluding the public from access to information affecting health, safety,
and other important policies. The same may be true for private
settlement agreements. 166  However, secrecy of awards may be more
problematic because arbitrating parties generally waive public law and
procedures pursuant to pre-dispute contracts, at a time when they likely
lack experience or information to realize the effects of arbitration.167 In
contrast, parties to settlement agreements enjoy more consent and control
in resolution processes leading to theirpost-dispute settlements.
Accordingly, it may be appropriate to require publication of
arbitration awards affecting areas of public concern, even if the same
may not be true for settlements. At the lease, the public should have
access to a limited amount of information about arbitration proceedings
affecting health or safety. 168  For example, public disclosure and
published opinions may be warranted in the flammable fabrics and MH
warranties cases discussed above. 1
69
That does not mean arbitration should be fully transparent. Again,
arbitrating parties often desire and benefit from privacy of arbitration
proceedings, and may be wise to decrease arbitral transparency through
confidentiality agreements. 170  The problem is that current confusion
regarding arbitration's secrecy has hindered parties' and policymakers'
appreciation of the tensions raised by the privacy paradox.
V. TWO-PRONGED POLICY TO ADDRESS TENSIONS OF THE PRIVACY
PARADOX
This Article calls for awareness of the privacy paradox and the
complex tensions it raises for policymakers considering the proper role
of transparency in arbitration. The Article also seeks to spark textured
debate for transparency reforms by offering a two-prong reform for both
increased and decreased arbitral transparency: (1) increase transparency
166. Arbitration awards may be more transparent than settlements when awards become public
during judicial confirmation or challenges, although settlement contracts may also become public
during litigation regarding their enforcement.
167. See supra notes 121-37, and accompanying text (discussing repeat player advantages).
168. See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text (discussing privatization of law).
169. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text (discussing the role of litigation in airing
dangers of flannelette and the inadequacies of fabric flamability regulations).
170. See supra notes 67-101 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of privacy and
confidentiality agreements in arbitration).
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by requiring published awards and reports in cases affecting public rights
and interests; but (2) decrease transparency by requiring confidentiality
of individuals' personal information revealed during arbitration. The
Article, therefore, cautions contracting parties and policymakers to
consider not only the public's interest in accessing arbitration
information, but also individuals' interests in protecting the
confidentiality of sensitive information revealed in arbitration. This
recognizes, however, that more empirical research is necessary regarding
parties' needs and experiences regarding arbitral confidentiality. 7 '
Current surveys of arbitration satisfaction provide only surface replies
with respect to confidentiality.
7 2
A. Means for Facilitating Two-Pronged Policy
An initial inquiry in crafting transparency policy is to determine how
such policy should evolve: through contract drafting, revision of
institutional arbitral rules, or development of legislative mandates?
Arbitration is a matter of contract, and therefore it would be ideal if
parties protected their own and the public's interests in their individual
bargains. Bargaining realities, however, often prevent individuals from
negotiating confidentiality provisions in arbitration contracts. Moreover,
the public generally has no say in parties' private agreements.
Legislative or administrative rules may therefore be warranted to
increase access to information affecting important public interests
without jeopardizing arbitrating parties' legitimate secrecy needs.
1. Contractual Creation
a. Directly in Parties' Contracts
Parties to a pre-dispute contract containing an arbitration clause often
do not invest time or resources in negotiating privacy and confidentiality
171. Researchers have reported limited surveys of parties' satisfaction with arbitration. See, e.g.,
HARRIS INTERACTIVE, ARBITRATION: SIMPLER, CHEAPER, AND FASTER THAN LITIGATION (2005),
available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resources/ArbitrationStudyFinal.pdf (reporting
U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform commissioned survey of participants' views of arbitration).
These surveys generally focus on overall satisfaction with speed, cost, and fairness of the process
and researchers broadly ask "were you very, moderately, or not satisfied with..." questions. Id. at
22-29.
172. For example, in a recent survey of 609 arbitration participants, seventy-nine percent of the
respondents checked "very satisfied" or "moderately satisfied" when asked "[h]ow [they] would
rate... the confidentiality of the process" in an online survey. Id. at 27. This reveals very little,
however, because most of the respondents agreed to arbitrate after disputes arose, the claims were
not in sensitive areas, and the question did not define confidentiality. Id. at 9, 12, 27.
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rules for possible proceedings. This generally is efficient because there
is no reason for these parties to waste resources wrangling over details of
future arbitration proceedings they never expect to pursue., 73  When
arbitration contracts include such rules, however, they tend to favor
corporate parties who draft rules to protect the privacy of their business
secrets and arbitration results. In contrast, consumers and employees
who become subject to form arbitration provisions usually lack the
arbitration experience or resources to comprehend the significance of an
arbitration clause, let alone their need to contractually protect
confidentiality of their personal information.
Accordingly, it is unlikely that transparency reforms will occur
solely through parties' contract negotiations. Companies generally lack
incentive to draft their form contracts to require publication of awards
revealing their statutory violations or other misconduct. 174 Individuals
usually lack resources or experience to successfully negotiating for
contract provisions protecting the confidentiality of their sensitive
information.
b. Incorporated Through Institutional Arbitration Rules
Institutional or administrative arbitration rules apply when parties
incorporate them in their contracts. In other words, these rules may
become contract terms by reference. Accordingly, arbitral institutions
could reform their rules to expressly cover confidentiality and
transparency. This would save contracting parties from having to invest
their resources to draft these provisions. It also may foster rules with
balanced concern for the interests of all involved in arbitration because
bargaining and resource imbalances may play less of a role in
development of institutional rules than in parties' contractual
negotiations.
Some arbitral institutions have already promulgated transparency
rules to foster goodwill. For example, the NASD sought to boost its
image by requiring that written awards be provided to the parties and
public in its arbitrations.175 In addition, the NASD recently has proposed
173. See Tarek F. Abdalla, Litigation vs. Arbitration: Which Is Better for the Commercial
Dispute?, PRAc. LITIGATOR, Sept. 2005, at 47, 51, 52 (seeming to assume arbitration is both
confidential and private, and failing to suggest that parties expressly protect confidentiality of
arbitration information in their agreements).
174. This may be unfair. Furthermore, securities law may require companies to reveal
information regarding their legal scuffles in certain public filings.
175. NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE 10330 (Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers 2005),
available at http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/display.html.
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rules to allow customers and associated persons in industry controversies
to require arbitrators to issue these awards with reasoned opinions.
17 6
NASD arbitration, however, is more transparent than purely private
arbitration because the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
enjoys regulatory authority over its proceedings. Most institutions that
administer arbitrations under parties' private agreements take no position
on whether parties should agree to keep information regarding their cases
confidential. 77  They also may be reluctant to embrace the time-
consuming and possibly contentious tasks of developing transparency
rules and publishing awards in a systematic manner. Moreover, some
administering institutions would be hesitant to risk losing repeat clientele
by requiring disclosure of awards. Such rules may cause repeat players
to avoid these institutions or reform their arbitration contracts to require
ad hoc administration.
2. Legislative Regulations
Again, it may be difficult for parties to draft and mutually accept
transparency provisions that appropriately protect all parties, as well as
the public's interests in access to information. Employers and
manufacturers usually do not voluntarily publish arbitration awards that
indicate statutory violations, and all disputants do not enjoy equal access
and power in the press. Furthermore, arbitral institutions are unlikely to
act in unison to develop and implement uniform transparency reforms.
Accordingly, legislative regulations may be necessary to foster reforms
that minimize perils of the privacy paradox.
Legislative creation of transparency reforms would not be a simple
task. Legislators who draft such reforms would have to consider tensions
between contract freedom and fair access to information in light of the
textured interests of contracting parties as well as the public.
Nonetheless, legislators hopefully would pursue that task with balanced
concerns and understandings.178  Furthermore, consumer groups
176. NASD Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change, Release No. 34-52009 70 Fed. Reg.
41,065 (July 15, 2005).
177. See American Arbitration Ass'n, Statement of Ethical Principles for the American
Arbitration Association, an ADR Provider Organization, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22036 (last
visited Jan. 31, 2006) (stating that although "AAA staff and neutrals have an ethical obligation to
keep information confidential, the AAA takes no position on whether parties should or should not
agree to keep the proceeding and award confidential between themselves"). Note also that NASD
may be different because it is a self-regulatory agency that must act pursuant to the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 and federal directives of the SEC geared to protect customers from securities
fraud.
178. This is admittedly an optimistic view.
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generally have more access and opportunity to impact statutory drafting
than corporate crafting. Corporations do not hold open hearings to
gather input regarding their form contracts. Instead, they are free to
fashion forms to serve their business interests.1
79
Legislative rules also allow for greater scope by extending to not
only parties to an arbitration agreement, but also arbitrators and other
third parties who participate in arbitration proceedings. Confidentiality
provisions in an arbitration agreement do not bind non-parties to the
agreement. Furthermore, these non-parties generally have no incentive
to sign provisions protecting confidentiality of arbitrating parties'
personal information. 180.
State legislatures may be best suited to promulgate such transparency
and confidentiality rules due to their likely understanding of local
contract law. The FAA may preempt such state rules, however, in light
of the Supreme Court's insistence that the FAA preempts any state laws
that single out arbitration agreements for special treatment or otherwise
hinder enforcement of arbitration. Accordingly, the FAA may preempt
state rules requiring publication of awards or confidentiality protections
that differ from parties' agreements or seem to conflict with FAA pro-
arbitration policy. Nonetheless, such rules may pass preemption analysis
if they are promulgated as default standards parties could vary by
contract. Furthermore, it seems such rules would actually promote
arbitration by boosting its legitimacy, and therefore its use and
acceptance. ' 8
B. Promotion of Transparency and Protection of Secrecy
This is not the first Article to suggest publication of arbitration
awards.18 2  It is unique, however, in its recognition of the confusion
regarding the differing aspects of confidentiality and privacy in
arbitration, and the underappreciated effects of this confusion. To
untangle this confusion and its impact, this Article proposes both limited
publication of arbitration awards affecting important public interests and
default rules that protect the confidentiality of individuals' sensitive
personal information revealed in arbitration. In some cases, this may
179. See Drahozal, supra note 7, at 741, 764 (explaining how companies may share cost savings
of their arbitration programs with individuals).
180. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text (discussing confusion and assumptions
regarding arbitration's confidentiality and lopsided protections).
181. There are other arguments for how state legislatures may avoid preemption problems.
Broader discussion of preemption, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
182. See, e.g., Gibbons, supra note 65, at 784-93 (proposing publication of e-arbitration awards
in cyberspace where the public has an interest in interpretation and enforcement of the contract).
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warrant publication of an arbitration report with careful extraction of
individuals' personal information the public has no right or need to
know. Furthermore, it may justify injunctive relief or sanctions to
enforce rules precluding nonconsensual disclosure or use of one's
personal information.
1. Publication of Arbitration Reports in Cases Affecting Important
Public Interests
Arbitration proceedings and awards should generally remain private.
Hearings should remain closed to uninvited third parties, and all awards
need not become public.1 83 This privacy is a benefit of arbitration, and
may foster arbitration's efficiency, flexibility, and equity. 184 It also may
promote candor and non-adversarial relational mending. 185 Contractual
liberty also warns against transparency rules that unduly intrude on
parties' contract choices. Accordingly, any rules requiring publication of
awards should be limited with respect to types of cases covered,
substantive writing requirements, and means for publishing these awards.
Such publication rules should therefore cover only cases affecting
important public interests, such as those involving health or safety.186
These are usually the cases in which public interests in transparency
prevail over private secrecy interests. They also are generally statutory
claim cases in which establishing precedent and informing the public are
most important. In addition, although tort, contract, and other non-
statutory claims may impact public issues, they often are accompanied
by statutory claims. Moreover, it would likely create litigation and
confusion to require courts or arbitrators to determine on a case-by-case
basis when arbitrations impact "public interests."
Accordingly, a good option would be to require publication of
arbitration reports in cases involving a stated list of statutory claims that
most impact health and safety. A legislative or administrative task force
could clarify this list to include discrimination, consumer protection,
corruption, and fraud statutes. 87  The list also could include cases
183. See also Sternlight, supra note 6, at 1673-74 (concluding that "[p]rivate 'justice' is truly
problematic" because it impedes enforcement of societal norms and equal treatment, but noting how
all societies do not feature public trials or precedent and all disputes need not be decided publicly).
184. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text (discussing pros of privacy in arbitration).
185. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (discussing relational benefits of ADR
privacy).
186. Similarly, the public import of class arbitrations led the AAA to require that awards in these
arbitrations be made publicly available. See, e.g., Nissen, supra note 105, at 21 (explaining AAA
class arbitration rules requiring that reasoned awards be made publicly available).
187. Of course, this is no easy task, and it could be difficult to determine the authority or make-
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
involving disputes arising from contracts created over the Internet. 88
This likely would capture most cases of public import, and would be less
costly than requiring publication in all statutory claim cases. It also
would minimize confusion and inefficiencies of requiring case-by-case
determinations of when publication is required.
Publication rules also could minimize inefficiencies by limiting the
substance of reports. Published reports could be limited to the identity of
the parties and arbitrators, arbitrator and administrative fees, hearings
and disposition dates, a brief description of the claims, and a statement of
results. For example, California requires arbitral institutions to publish
such basic arbitration reports in consumer cases. 89 Similarly, the NASD
requires publication of such basic awards in its arbitrations.190 The
NASD also has proposed rules allowing a party to require that arbitrators
briefly state fact-based reasons for their conclusions.' 91 This requirement
would be limited, however, in that arbitrators would not have to provide
legal authorities or specific damage calculations, and a party would have
to alert arbitrators of a request for reasons at least twenty days in advance
of hearings to provide arbitrators with proper warning and an opportunity
to decline appointment if they feel unable to comply with a request. 192
Such limited reports may not further the development of the law to
the extent of reasoned and publicly reported judicial opinions, but they
would provide more public information and signaling benefits than
purely private awards or settlement agreements. Indeed, only two
percent of cases make it through trial, and very few cases become
up of this committee. However, a legislative task force could include representatives from all
affected groups to build acceptance and limit inefficiencies of on-going battles regarding what
claims require published reports.
188. See, e.g., Gibbons, supra note 65, at 771-72, 784-93 (examining the role of privacy in
online arbitration and proposing publication rules aimed to increase transparency of "the process, the
award, and the reasoning behind the award" to establish the legitimacy and fairness of such
arbitration); Lucille M. Ponte, Broadening Traditional ADR Notions of Disclosure: Special
Considerations for Posting Conflict Resolution Policies and Programs on E-Business Web Sites, 17
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 321, 321-24, 338-39 (2002) (discussing growth and popularity of on-
line dispute resolution programs and proposing that e-businesses be required to disclose existence,
costs, and other information regarding these programs to properly inform consumers and increase
credibility of these programs).
189. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (Deering 2005) (requiring at least quarterly publication of
consumer arbitration reports that include the name of the nonconsumer party, type of dispute,
prevailing party, how many times the nonconsumer has been party to such arbitration, whether the
consumer was represented by an attorney, dates of arbitral events, disposition, amount of claim and
award, names of arbitrators, fees, and percentage of fees allocated to each party).
190. Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change, supra note 105.
191. Id.
192. Id. In addition, the NASD rules do not allow parties to require statements of reasons in
abbreviated arbitrations decided on the pleadings or conducted under default procedures. Id.
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subjects of judicial opinions. 193 Furthermore, the growing competition
among arbitrators may give arbitrators incentives to publish quality
opinions to signal their knowledge and expertise in an area.
194
Nonetheless, publication rules should balance need for legal
development and public access with maintenance of arbitral efficiencies,
and should not lead quality arbitrators, especially non-attorneys, to leave
the arbitrator market.1
95
In addition, rules could allow for minimal supplemental
compensation for arbitrators in cases requiring reasoned awards. For
example, NASD's recent proposal allows arbitrators required to write
reasoned opinions to earn an extra $200, which the NASD and arbitrating
parties would split.196 This works well where NASD arbitrators earn flat
fees per hearing, but parties may have to pay additional costs measured
by arbitrators' time spent writing reports where parties must pay
arbitrators on an hourly basis. Nonetheless, some arbitral institutions
may agree to bear all or most additional costs of publication to foster
goodwill and improve public perception of their processes.' 97 They also
may roll report and publication costs into administrative fees, and may
allocate the fees to parties based on ability to pay. 198  In ad hoc
arbitrations, the parties most likely would have to split report and
publication costs, unless they agree otherwise in their arbitration
agreements.
Policymakers also should consider efficiencies and burden
allocations in determining responsibility and means for gathering and
publishing these awards. Publication requires human and economic
resources, and the government may not be best situated for the job.
Instead, arbitrators or arbitration administering institutions likely would
193. See Boyd N. Boland, Most Cases Settle: The "Vanishing Trial"from the Perspective of a
Settlement Judge, TRiAL TALK June/July, 2005 at 15 (noting that nationally, the likelihood that a
case will go through trial is less than two percent). Settlement impedes development of the law to a
much greater extent than arbitration, which has led some judges to lament the lack of trials. See id
at 17 (Judge Higginbotham noting that trials are necessary to clarify normative legal standards).
194. Drahozal, supra note 5, at 550.
195. Restrictions on requiring legal authorities or intricate calculations should ease these
concerns.
196. Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change, supra note 105, at 5.
197. See infra note 202 and accompanying text (access to some AAA redacted awards available
for a relatively low fee).
198. It is nonetheless unclear how the AAA allocates costs of arbitrators' time writing reports in
employment disputes, and whether the AAA folds publication costs into employment administrative
fees. National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes, 34 & 40 (AAA 2005) (failing to
state arbitrators' compensation or how report costs are allocated). Additionally, the employer pays
filing and hearing fees over the $125 paid by the employee, and these fees range from $750 to
$10,000 depending on the amount of the claim, plus $300-$500 per day for hearings. National
Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes, Administrative Fee Schedule (AAA 2005).
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be responsible for making these reports public in a systematic manner.
This seems appropriate because they likely would have the means and
resources to accomplish this task efficiently through use of the Internet.
For example, California requires arbitration administrators to make
their consumer arbitration reports available to the public for free over the
Internet, but allows them to charge a fee for paper copies of these
reports. 199 In addition, NASD publishes reports from its arbitrations on
the Internet.200 Similarly, the AAA makes redacted versions of its
employment awards electronically available to the public for a fairly low
fee of $100 for a one-year subscription. 20 1 The aim should be to make
arbitration reports as accessible to common individuals as they are to
repeat players and other sophisticated parties, without overly adding to
formalities and costs of arbitration to the award database.
20 2
There are many questions and options that must be explored and
debated.20 3 Determining what, when, and how to publish arbitration
awards merely scrapes the tip of the issue iceberg. Furthermore,
publication is not without costs, both in terms of resources and impacts
on private dispute resolution values. Public law, legitimacy, and fairness
values, however, justify these costs in statutory areas of particular public
concern.
2. Preservation of Confidentiality to Protect Personal and Proprietary
Information
While increased transparency may be warranted with respect to
arbitration awards affecting public issues, decreased transparency may be
necessary to protect individuals from unwanted disclosure or use of their
personal information revealed in arbitration. It also may be beneficial to
199. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (Deering 2005).
200. See Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, NASD Dispute Resolution to Provide
Arbitration Awards Online (May 10, 2001), available at http://www.nasd.com/ (type: "NASD
Dispute Resolution to Provide Arbitration Awards Online" into the 'search' box, then click on the
first available article) (stating how NASD worked with the Securities Arbitration Commentator to
make awards readily accessible online and maintain the library of awards).
201. AAA Employment Awards Database, http://www.adr.org/AAAAwards (last visited Feb. 3,
2006) (providing access to redacted awards from AAA employment arbitrations filed after January
1, 1999 for a yearly fee of $100, but allowing access to a sample award for free at,
http://www.adr.org/AAAAwards/Docs/exampleaward.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2006)).
202. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Citigroup Global Mkts., No. 03-05011, 2005 WL 782876 (N.A.S.D.
Mar. 22, 2005) (Sasnett-Stauffer, Arb.), available at http://scan.cch.com/aad/200503/03-0501 l.pdf
(exemplifying an electronically published opinion, including basic but informative party, case, issue,
outcome, and remedy information).
203. See Stemlight, supra note 6, at 1658-61 (emphasizing that some disputes regarding
arbitration "cry out for empirical studies," but such research is difficult because arbitration is
private).
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protect business secrets. This does not mean courts should disregard
confidentiality provisions in parties' arbitration agreements.2 °4  Instead,
the aim should be to develop default confidentiality protections parties
likely would approve in a hypothetical bargain.
As discussed above, parties without resources or arbitration
experience generally do not protect their confidentiality interests. For
example, consumers usually accept pre-dispute arbitration clauses in
their contracts without considering that they may need to protect
confidentiality of their financial, medical, and other personal information
revealed during any future arbitration. Additionally, although some
companies contractually protect their business secrets, others neglect to
do so in their arbitration agreements. In such cases, default rules
requiring confidentiality of personal information and business secrets
likely would mimic what the parties would have negotiated had they had
the necessary experience and opportunity to do so.
Such confidentiality protection is not unprecedented. Policymakers
have recognized businesses' and individuals' legitimate confidentiality
interests in crafting evidentiary rules and privileges geared to protect
sensitive information from unwanted disclosure in litigation. 2°' For
example, evidentiary rules applicable in court preclude admissibility of
evidence of sexual behavior and settlement negotiations unless the need
for the evidence substantially outweighs the risk that disclosure will
harm a claimant or unfairly prejudice a party. 20 6 Privilege rules also may
preclude disclosure or admissibility of communications arising in
fiduciary or other protected relational contexts. For example, a
204. See Gibbons, supra note 65, at 790-91 (courts should honor parties' confidentiality
agreements unless the court finds competing public interests in disclosure). Courts should be
vigilant in analyzing the enforceability of these agreements under contract law and should resist the
urge to quickly dismiss disfavored defenses such as duress and unconscionability.
205. Although arbitrators may apply similar restrictions on information in exercising their
discretion regarding evidentiary matter, such protections are not guaranteed in arbitration. See, e.g.,
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1304-05 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that remedial and
procedural protections available in court would not apply in arbitration of sexual harassment claims
in finding the arbitration agreement unconscionable, especially because California evidentiary rules
would have protected the privacy rights of sexual harassment victims in court). But see Beauchamp
v. Great W. Life Assurance Co., 918 F. Supp. 1091, 1096-98 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (disagreeing with
Prudential in part because the court in that case believed the California rule precluding admission of
claimant's sexual history did not apply in arbitration).
206. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412 (restricting admissibility of evidence in civil and criminal cases
regarding past sexual behavior or predisposition); FED. R. EvID. 408 (limiting admissibility of
evidence regarding compromise negotiations); Monnin, supra note 103, at 1155, 1190 (discussing
scope and justifications for evidentiary rules limiting evidence of sexual behavior or predisposition
in civil and criminal proceedings). Courts apply a balancing test to determine whether admission of
the evidence is warranted. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2). In applying this balancing test, however,
arbitrators must vigilantly recognize the degrading and harmful nature of such information. Monnin,
supra note 103, at 1189-91.
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physician-patient privilege may protect sensitive medical information
from discovery. Similarly an accountant-client privilege may limit or
preclude disclosure of financial information.
20 7
In addition, some courts use insular disclosure orders to limit use of
financial information in litigation to prevent its nonconsensual use or
disclosure. California courts, for example, use this device to allow a
requesting party's counsel to examine relevant financial information for
purposes of proving punitive damages, but prevent counsel from sharing
that information with clients or other third parties.2°8  Courts also may
balance need for relevant information with confidentiality concerns by
ordering in camera inspection of financial and other personal
information. In a child support case, for example, the court found that
the parties' personal financial records were relevant, but examined the
records in camera to minimize unwanted disclosure of such
information.
209
Similar rules may be warranted in arbitration in the absence of
contrary agreement. 2  For example, the Consumer Due Process
Protocols, promulgated by the National Consumer Disputes Advisory
Committee, suggest that arbitrators should "make reasonable efforts to
maintain the privacy of the hearing" and "carefully consider claims of
privilege and confidentiality when addressing evidentiary issues., 21 1 In
207. See FED. R. EVID. 501 (stating evidentiary privileges are governed by state law); CAL.
EvID. CODE § 994 (Deering 2005) (declaring privilege precluding testimony of physicians regarding
communications with patients); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107(l)(f)(I) (West 2005) (declaring
a privilege preventing accountants from testifying regarding communications with a client pertaining
to financial information relevant to the professional employment); Colo. State Bd. of Accountancy v.
Raisch, 931 P.2d 498, 500 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (finding "accountant-client privilege... appli[es]
without exception to all communications between the client and the certified public accountant and
the accountant's employees specified in the statute").
208. See Coll. Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court, 882 P.2d 894, 898 (Cal. 1994) (explaining that
pretrial discovery limits on financial information are necessary to prevent parties from being coerced
into settlements to avoid unwanted disclosure of financial information); Richards v. Superior Court,
150 Cal. Rptr. 77, 80-81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (explaining that a party compelled to reveal financial
information relevant to a claim for punitive damages is "presumptively entitled to a protective order
that the information need be revealed only to counsel for the discovering party" and that the
information may only be used for that lawsuit); Penelope Potter Palumbo, Balancing Competing
Discovery Interests in the Context of the Attorney-Client Relationship. A Trilemma, 56 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1115, 1115-17 (1983) (explaining use of insular protective orders for financial information in
punitive damages cases).
209. See Wollerson v. Wollerson, 687 So. 2d 663, 666 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that tax
returns and other financial information were relevant to a request for increased child support, but
ordering that the court inspect such information in camera to strictly limit disclosure to only the
most relevant information).
210. See supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text (discussing this paradox and confusion
regarding secrecy of arbitration).
211. AAA, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF
CONSUMER DISPUTES (1998), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id+22019#PRINCIPLE 12
ARBITRATIONHEARINGS. The protocol fails to address the need to protect individuals'
2006] UNTANGLING THE PRIVACY PARADOX IN ARBITRATION 1251
addition, more particularized default rules could go further to clarify that
arbitrators must apply a stated list of protections for personal, sensitive
and proprietary information. It would then be up to the parties to alter or
waive such default confidentiality rules.
Parties' agreements, however, would be subject to general contract
defenses and any mandatory report publication rules.212 Furthermore,
parties could waive confidentiality by placing confidential information at
issue in later public proceedings.213 For example, parties currently make
otherwise confidential information subject to disclosure by using it to
challenge the enforceability of an arbitration award in court. 2
14
Policymakers would have to balance these confidentiality protections
with any report publication rules.21 5  In some cases, arbitrators would
have to publish arbitration reports with personal information redacted
from the reports. This may allow for limited information to appear in a
claim description, but require that the claimant's identity remain
confidential unless the claimant waives or otherwise alters confidentiality
rules.21 6 The AAA International Arbitration Rules, for example, allow
the administrator to publish selected awards, decisions, and rulings
without the parties' consent after they have been "edited to conceal the
names of the parties and other identifying details."
2 17
Similarly, a published award in a sexual harassment case may
contain basic facts regarding the claim, results, and reasons for the
results, but should not contain sensitive information about the claimant's
relationships or bouts with depression. It also may be appropriate to
redact the identities of the particular individuals involved to preserve
reputations and save them from public embarrassment. This generally
information, perhaps due to the committee's stated concern with preventing repeat players from
abusing their disproportionate access to information. Id. (Reporter's Comments).
212. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Default Rule Theory and International Arbitration Law (with
Comments on Expanded Review and Ex Parte Interim Reliej), INT'L ARB. NEWS, Winter 2004/2005,
at 3-4, available at http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/committees/disputes/commercial disputes/
winter04O5.pdf (explaining that mandatory rules may be proper to protect third party interests).
213. These waivers and modifications would then be subject to scrutiny under contract and other
enforcement principles.
214. A consumer may challenge an award, for example, on grounds that the arbitration award
exceeded the arbitrator's power because the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. In that
context, the consumer may use personal financial and social information to support that claim. If the
consumer does not obtain any protective order and chooses to publicly reveal this information, it
seems the information should no longer be deemed confidential.
215. For example, information about a sexual harassment claimant's bouts with depression may
be revealed during arbitration of his or her claims, but this information should not become subject to
public disclosure unless the claimant waives confidentiality protections.
216. These are merely ideas, and full exploration of their propriety and implications is beyond
the scope of this Article.
217. INT'L ARB. R. art. 27 (also making this subject to parties' other agreement).
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should not, however, prevent publication of a corporate employer's
identity, especially where future claimants and others have an important
interest in accessing information regarding a corporation's
discriminatory practices.
Confidentiality protection rules also should prescribe reasonable
enforcement mechanisms. "Protections" protect nothing if parties can
easily ignore and evade them. Furthermore, enforcement mechanisms
may be particularly important with respect to arbitral confidentiality to
prevent parties from leaking information to the press or otherwise
revealing sensitive information to manipulate or coerce the other party
into settlement. Such mechanisms also should be fairly clear and easy to
apply to prevent innocent disclosures and minimize difficulties and
inefficiencies of requiring parties to prove actual damages for breach of
confidentiality rules. Confidentiality rules should not punish innocent
human inclinations to talk, or become empty vessels that leave parties
with no remedy.
Accordingly, such rules could allow for injunctive relief to preclude
parties from "letting the cat out of the bag" by disclosing information in
the first place. Once information has been revealed, however, it may be
appropriate to order monetary sanctions for intentional disclosure of
protected information. Although such remedies come with their own
complications, they would be more efficient and satisfying than requiring
courts to assess proof and propriety of actual damages on a case-by-case
basis. 218
Again, there is great need for empirical research on all these
questions and issues. 2 19  Confidentiality protections should balance
concern for all parties involved in disputes, while not overly intruding on
contractual liberty. Regulation should not go beyond proper protection
to paternalism. This is especially true because overly protective
measures could backfire by providing repeat players with auxiliary
means for hiding information.22 °
218. It also may be appropriate to give arbitrators discretion to determine proper sanctions, under
their already broad remedial powers per institutional rules or legislative regulations authorizing such
arbitral power. This power could be used not only to order monetary sanctions, but also to direct
evidentiary sanctions. For example, an arbitrator may deem improperly disclosed information
inadmissible in the arbitration.
219. See DRAHOZAL, supra note 14, at 552 (emphasizing great need for such research regarding
arbitration practice).
220. Perhaps confidentiality rules should cover only "personal" information, such as individuals'
financial, sexual, social, or familial information, in order to prevent such improper use of the rules.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Common understandings of privacy in arbitration often lull
individuals into assuming personal information revealed in arbitration
may not become public. They assume privacy and confidentiality are
synonymous, as though arbitration is like a trip to Las Vegas: "What
happens in arbitration stays in arbitration." The reality, however, is that
arbitration is private but not necessarily confidential. This is the privacy
paradox: it defies common conceptions of arbitration's secrecy, but is
nonetheless true. This paradox is problematic because it leads to
shortsighted contracting and simplistic assumptions about arbitral justice.
Moreover, it may foster injustice when repeat players unduly benefit
from unpublished awards as well as pro-drafter confidentiality
provisions.
This Article thus calls contracting parties to more carefully draft
their arbitration contracts, and invites policymakers to craft transparency
reforms that consider tensions created by the privacy paradox. It seeks to
spark discussion of multi-perspective transparency reforms by proposing
a two-prong approach toward transparency: (1) Require publication of
arbitration awards in arbitrations involving statutory discrimination,
consumer protection, corruption, and fraud; and (2) Establish default
rules protecting personal and proprietary information from use or
disclosure outside of arbitration hearings. The key is to balance all
parties' interests in confidentiality and privacy with the public's
legitimate interests in accessing information that may affect health,
safety or wellbeing. Indeed, tempered and properly guided secrecy
standards could enhance arbitration's value for disputing parties, as well
as the public.

